Troxel v. Granville
The Supreme Court struck down, as applied, a Washington law that let any person petition for visitation with a child at any time, ruling that it violated a mother's constitutional right to decide who could see her daughters.
The Court found that judges had given no special weight to the fit mother's own judgment about what was best for her children, undermining a fundamental parental right that the Constitution has long protected.
How it got here: A Washington trial court ordered visitation; an intermediate appeals court reversed on statutory grounds; the Washington Supreme Court affirmed on constitutional grounds, and the Troxels sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie, but never married and separated in 1991. After Brad died by suicide in 1993, his parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel, continued seeing the girls until Granville sought to limit visits to one short outing per month. The Troxels sued under a Washington law letting any person seek visitation whenever a judge thought it served a child's best interest.
The question before the Court
Could a state let virtually anyone ask a judge for visitation with a child, over a fit parent's objection, whenever a judge thought it would be best for the child?
Why it matters
Grandparents and other relatives across the country routinely seek court-ordered visitation, and this ruling means courts must give real weight to a fit parent's own wishes rather than simply second-guessing them. States with broad visitation laws may need to build in protections for parental decision-making, though the Court left many of the details for future cases.
What changes now
This is a final decision on the merits, though a narrow one: the Court struck down the Washington law only as applied to this mother and family, and declined to decide whether all nonparental visitation laws must require proof of harm to the child. The case does not return to any court for further proceedings, since the Court found no need to remand. Other states' visitation laws will continue to be tested in future litigation.
What this does not decide
The Court decided only that this particular visitation order, applied to this mother in this case, was unconstitutional. It did not decide whether the Constitution requires every nonparental visitation law to show potential harm to the child, did not define the exact scope of parents' visitation-related rights, and did not rule the Washington statute invalid on its face.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Connor (author).
Separate writings (2). Justice Souter (author of a concurrence).
Dissent (3). Justice Stevens (author).
Concurrence — Justice Souter
Justice Souter would have gone further and struck down the Washington statute on its face, agreeing with the state supreme court's reasoning that a law letting any person petition for visitation at any time, based only on a judge's best-interest view, unconstitutionally sweeps too broadly. He would not have reached the question whether a showing of harm is required. Read the full concurrence →
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed the case is resolved by the recognized fundamental right of parents to direct their children's upbringing, but argued the Court should have applied strict scrutiny to any law infringing that right. He found Washington lacked even a legitimate interest, let alone a compelling one, in second-guessing a fit parent's visitation decision. Read the full concurrence →
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued the Court should have addressed the state supreme court's facial ruling directly rather than deciding the case as applied, and that neither the statute's broad 'any person, any time' language nor its lack of a harm requirement made it facially invalid. He also stressed that children themselves have constitutionally relevant interests in preserving relationships, which the majority undervalued, and would have remanded for further state-court proceedings. Read the full dissent →
Dissent — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia argued that unenumerated parental rights, while real in his view, are not judicially enforceable under the Constitution, and that recognizing such a right invites judges to craft family law themselves. He would have left these questions to legislatures and reversed the judgment below. Read the full dissent →
Dissent — Justice Kennedy
“the custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the State, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child.”Kennedy's summary of the parental right both sides agreed exists, before disagreeing on the remedy.
Justice Kennedy agreed a parent's right to raise a child free of undue state interference is real but argued the Washington Supreme Court erred by requiring proof of harm in every visitation case, since the best-interests standard is used almost universally and can sometimes be constitutionally adequate. He would have vacated and remanded so the state courts could reconsider the specific order under the correct standard. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began from the long-recognized principle that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children, tracing this back to early 20th-century rulings about the right to raise and educate one's children.
- Because a fit parent is presumed to act in her children's best interests, the Court reasoned that once a parent is not shown to be unfit, her decisions about visitation are entitled to material weight and cannot simply be overridden because a judge disagrees.
- Applying this framework to the Washington law, the Court found the statute let 'any person' seek visitation 'at any time' with the only limit being a judge's own view of the child's best interest, giving no presumption of validity to the parent's decision at all.
- Examining the trial record, the Court found the judge had effectively required the mother to disprove that visitation was in her daughters' interest, reversing the usual presumption that favors a fit parent's judgment, and had relied on thin factual findings and the judge's own family experiences rather than any special justification for overriding her wishes.
- Because the order rested on nothing more than a disagreement between the judge and a fit parent about her children's best interests, the Court concluded that applying the statute in this way exceeded the limits the Due Process Clause places on state interference with parental decision-making.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Meyer v. Nebraska (262 U. S. 390)
The Court relied on Meyer's recognition of a parent's right to raise and educate children as still-good law.
Reaffirms Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U. S. 510)
The Court leaned on Pierce's holding that parents may direct their children's upbringing and education.
Reaffirms Prince v. Massachusetts (321 U. S. 158)
The Court reaffirmed Prince's statement that custody and care of children rests first with parents.