Cornell v. Coyne
The Supreme Court upheld a one-cent-per-pound federal tax on manufactured "filled cheese," ruling that the tax applied even to cheese made under contract for export and actually shipped overseas.
The Court said the Constitution's ban on export taxes only bars burdens placed on the act of exporting itself, not ordinary manufacturing taxes that apply equally to goods whether they end up sold at home or abroad.
“The true construction of the constitutional provision is that no burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situated.”
The majority's core rule distinguishing a burden on exporting from ordinary taxes that happen to fall on exported goods.
How it got here: The manufacturers sued the collector to recover taxes paid; the government's demurrer to their claim was sustained by the trial court, and they brought the case to the Supreme Court on a writ of error.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Illinois cheese manufacturers made "filled cheese" (a butter-substitute cheese product) under contracts with buyers in Liverpool and London, shipping it directly from their factory for export. A federal collector, acting under an 1896 act taxing filled cheese, charged them one cent per pound on every shipment, over the manufacturers' protest that the cheese was made solely for export.
The question before the Court
Could Congress tax cheese made for export the same as cheese sold at home, even though the Constitution bars taxes on exports?
Why it matters
The ruling meant manufacturers could not avoid federal excise or manufacturing taxes simply by showing their goods were destined for foreign markets, unless Congress specifically wrote in an export exemption (as it had for tobacco). This gave Congress broad room to tax production without triggering the Constitution's export-tax ban.
What changes now
The judgment against the cheese manufacturers was final and left the tax in place going forward for filled cheese made for export. The decision did not change the statute — only Congress could add an export exemption for filled cheese like the one it had already given tobacco and snuff manufacturers, and the opinion noted the difference in treatment was a policy choice for Congress, not the courts.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide that Congress could tax goods once they are actually in the process of being shipped abroad — it drew the line at ordinary manufacturing taxes applied before exportation begins. It also left open why Congress chose to exempt exported tobacco but not exported filled cheese.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Brewer (author).
Dissent (2). Justice Harlan (author), joined by Justice Fuller.
Dissent — Justice Harlan
“articles manufactured in this country, although manufactured only for exportation, and not for sale or consumption here, cannot be exported to other countries, except subject to such tax as Congress may choose to impose on the manufactured articles as property”Harlan's warning that the ruling lets Congress tax goods intended purely for foreign markets.
Justice Harlan argued the cheese was manufactured solely for export under pre-existing foreign contracts and was prepared for shipment immediately upon completion, so it was effectively already 'in the actual process of exportation' when taxed — making the levy an unconstitutional export tax. He also read the statute's reference to tobacco-stamp laws as incorporating an existing exemption for goods made for immediate export, meaning the tax should never have applied at all. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the Export Clause narrowly: it bars Congress from placing a burden on the act of exporting itself, but does not require Congress to give exporters a tax break or bounty they wouldn't otherwise get.
- It distinguished a tax on the process of manufacturing an article from a tax on the article because it is being exported — the filled-cheese tax fell on manufacturing, which happens before and regardless of any export, so it was not an export tax.
- The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Turpin v. Burgess, which held that a general tax applied to all goods alike, not triggered by or timed to exportation, does not violate the Export Clause even if most of the taxed goods end up shipped abroad.
- The Court also invoked the separate line of cases (Kidd v. Pearson and United States v. E.C. Knight Co.) holding that manufacturing is legally distinct from commerce, meaning an article does not become part of export commerce merely because the manufacturer intends to sell it overseas.
- Turning to the statute itself, the Court found no textual exemption for exported filled cheese comparable to the one Congress had written for exported tobacco and snuff, and held that any statutory ambiguity should be resolved in the government's favor rather than read as granting an unstated tax privilege.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Turpin v. Burgess (117 U.S. 504)
The Court relied on this case's rule that general taxes not tied to the act of exporting are constitutional.