Doe v. Bolton

1973-02-26

Headline: Court strikes down Georgia rules requiring hospital accreditation, committee approval, two-physician confirmation, and residency limits, making a physician’s clinical judgment sufficient and easing access for women and doctors.

Holding: The Court holds that Georgia’s requirements for JCAH hospital accreditation, hospital committee approval, mandatory two-doctor confirmation, and a residency bar violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and a licensed physician’s best clinical judgment suffices.

Real World Impact:

Invalidates Georgia hospital accreditation and committee approval requirements.
Ends the residency restriction, allowing nonresidents access to Georgia care.
Recognizes doctors’ clinical judgment as sufficient legal basis for abortions.

Topics: abortion access, privacy rights, medical regulation, state residency rules

Summary

Background

Mary Doe, a young Georgia woman, and a group of Georgia-licensed physicians and other professionals sued after Doe’s hospital abortion committee denied her request under Georgia’s new criminal abortion statutes (§§ 26-1201–26-1203). The 1968 law, modeled on the American Law Institute proposal, made most abortions criminal except in narrow situations and added procedural hurdles: residency proof, a written attending-physician judgment with concurrence by two other physicians, performance only in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), and advance approval by a hospital abortion committee. The District Court struck down some limits; the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal alongside Roe v. Wade.

Reasoning

The Court asked whether these Georgia procedures unlawfully restricted a woman’s and a physician’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Roe and United States v. Vuitch, the Court accepted that a licensed physician’s “best clinical judgment” — considering physical, emotional, psychological, familial factors and age — is the operative medical standard for lawful abortions. The Court rejected the State’s procedural barriers as not reasonably related to protecting health or potential fetal life: it found the JCAH-accreditation requirement, the hospital committee’s advance approval, the mandatory confirmation by two independent physicians, and the residency bar unconstitutional. The Court recognized standing for Doe and for physician-appellants and modified the District Court’s judgment accordingly.

Real world impact

The ruling removes several specified procedural roadblocks in Georgia law, recognizes a physician’s clinical judgment as sufficient legal basis for authorized abortions, and invalidates the residency restriction that barred nonresidents. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the District Court judgment as to the invalidated provisions and declined to issue an injunction, assuming state prosecutorial compliance.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Douglas and others emphasized broad privacy and health considerations; Chief Justice Burger concurred but would have been more comfortable with narrower confirmations. Justices White and Rehnquist dissented, arguing no constitutional right to abortion on demand and saying regulation should be left to state legislatures.