Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley
The Court struck down a Chicago ordinance that banned picketing near schools but exempted peaceful labor picketing, ruling that the carve-out amounted to unconstitutional discrimination based on what a sign said.
Because the law let picketers discuss labor disputes but not other topics like race discrimination, the Court found it violated equal protection principles intertwined with the First Amendment, reinforcing that government cannot pick and choose which messages may be heard in public spaces.
“But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
The Court's core rule against content-based restrictions on speech and picketing.
How it got here: A federal trial court dismissed Mosley's suit; the Seventh Circuit reversed the ordinance as overbroad; the Supreme Court granted review to consider it alongside a similar Illinois case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Earl Mosley, a postal worker, spent months peacefully picketing outside a Chicago high school with a sign accusing the school of racial discrimination. Chicago then passed an ordinance banning picketing near schools during school hours, but exempted peaceful picketing related to labor disputes. Mosley stopped picketing rather than risk arrest and sued, arguing the ordinance violated his free speech and equal protection rights.
The question before the Court
Could Chicago ban picketing outside schools while carving out a special exception just for peaceful labor picketing?
Why it matters
Cities and states writing rules for protests, picketing, or demonstrations now have to treat different messages the same way unless they have a strong, content-neutral reason for treating them differently. Anyone whose speech gets excluded from a public forum while a favored topic (like labor disputes) is allowed can point to this case to challenge that unequal treatment.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, not a temporary order. The judgment striking down Chicago's ordinance stands, meaning Chicago could no longer enforce the labor-only exemption as written. The city would need to draft any future school-picketing rules on content-neutral grounds -- for example, addressing actual disruption or safety -- rather than singling out labor disputes for favorable treatment.
What this does not decide
The Court did not hold that all picketing near schools must always be allowed; it left room for genuinely content-neutral time, place, and manner rules and for restrictions tied to actual disruption. It also did not decide the case on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, resolving it instead under equal protection.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Burger
Chief Justice Burger joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to caution that the majority's language should not be read literally to mean the First Amendment guarantees an unqualified right to express any thought free from all government restriction. He noted that established exceptions, such as those for obscenity and fighting words, still limit that broad statement.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court framed the case under the Equal Protection Clause because Chicago treated different picketers differently, even though the underlying dispute also implicated the First Amendment's protection of expressive conduct like picketing.
- The Court asked whether there was an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by treating labor picketing differently from all other picketing near schools -- the standard test for equal protection claims involving expression.
- The Court identified the operative distinction in the ordinance as the message on the picket sign itself, and held that the First Amendment forbids government from restricting expression based on its subject matter or content, regardless of the label used to justify the restriction.
- The Court acknowledged that reasonable time, place, and manner rules for picketing can be valid, and that governments may sometimes draw distinctions among picketers, but held that any such distinctions must be closely tied to a substantial governmental interest rather than resting on subject matter alone.
- Applying that standard, the Court found that Chicago's own decision to allow peaceful labor picketing near schools undercut its claim that peaceful picketing on other topics was uniquely disruptive, since peaceful picketing is peaceful regardless of its topic.
- The Court concluded that a broad ban on all nonlabor picketing was not narrowly tailored to the city's interest in preventing disruption, because the disruption Chicago feared could be addressed through content-neutral rules aimed at actual disorderly conduct rather than a blanket exclusion based on subject matter.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Niemotko v. Maryland (340 U.S. 268)
Relied on as precedent condemning unequal treatment of speakers based on the city's view of their message.
Reaffirms Cox v. Louisiana (379 U.S. 536)
Adopted Justice Black's concurring view that exempting labor picketing while banning other picketing is unconstitutional content discrimination.