OCTOBER TERM 1971 · DECIDED MAY 15, 1972 · 6–1

406 U.S. 205 · No. 70-110 · Argued December 8, 1971

Share

Wisconsin v. Yoder

AffirmedFinal ruling
religious freedomAmishcompulsory educationparental rightsFirst Amendment

Opinion of the Court by Justice Burger, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun

The Supreme Court ruled that Wisconsin could not criminally punish Amish parents for refusing to send their children to high school beyond the eighth grade, because the requirement violated the parents' First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.

The decision carved out a religious exception to an otherwise universal legal requirement, one of the few times the Court has let a tightly organized religious community opt out of a neutral, generally applicable law.

A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.
Justice Burger

The majority's defense of the Amish's unconventional way of life against the State's claim that it fosters ignorance.

How it got here: Wisconsin trial and circuit courts convicted the Amish parents; the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed on free-exercise grounds; the State sought and received Supreme Court review.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy were Amish or Amish Mennonite parents in Green County, Wisconsin, who refused to send their 14- and 15-year-old children to public high school after the children finished eighth grade, believing high school conflicted with their faith. The local school district charged the parents under Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, and they were convicted and fined $5 each.

The question before the Court

Could Wisconsin force Amish parents to send their fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds to high school past eighth grade, despite their religious objections?

The Court's answer

No — the Court ruled that Wisconsin could not enforce its compulsory high school attendance law against Amish parents whose sincere religious beliefs required removing their children from formal schooling after eighth grade. The Amish showed that their faith and daily life were inseparable, that one or two more years of high school threatened their community's survival, and that their existing informal vocational training already prepared children for adult Amish life.

Because the State's interest in a couple of extra years of schooling did not outweigh this deeply rooted religious practice, punishing the parents violated the Free Exercise Clause. The ruling still required Amish children to complete eighth grade and applied narrowly to communities, like the Amish, that could show the same depth of religious commitment and a workable alternative education.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Amish communities and similarly organized religious groups gained a lasting legal shield allowing children to end formal schooling after eighth grade without their parents facing prosecution. The decision also gave courts, states, and other religious groups a framework for weighing sincere religious objections against government interests, shaping later fights over religious exemptions from general laws.

What changes now

The ruling is a final merits decision, not subject to further proceedings on the central free-exercise question. It leaves Wisconsin and other states free to develop reasonable, non-intrusive standards for continuing vocational education of Amish children, and it does not resolve the separate question of whether a child's own wishes to attend high school, contrary to her parents, could give a State a stronger basis to intervene — an issue the Court explicitly left open for a future case with different facts.

What this does not decide

The Court's holding rests only on the parents' free-exercise rights, not any competing rights the children themselves might have. It explicitly declines to decide whether a child who personally wants to attend high school over her parents' religious objection could still be required to do so, leaving that question for another case.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Stewart

Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, stressed that the case does not involve any question about a child's own right to attend public high school if she wished to. He noted the record showed no evidence the children's religious views differed from their parents', so the separate issue Justice Douglas raised about children's independent interests simply was not presented here.

Concurrence — Justice White

Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, emphasized how narrow the ruling was: the Amish already provided eight years of schooling and objected only to two additional years, making this a much easier case than one where a religion rejected all schooling. He stressed the State's substantial interest in education while agreeing it was outweighed here.

Dissent in part — Justice Douglas

It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision.Douglas's central objection that the majority overlooked the children's own stake in the outcome.

Justice Douglas agreed the Amish parents' religious claim was sincere but objected that the Court ignored the children's own potential religious-freedom interests. He would have joined as to Jonas Yoder, since his daughter Frieda personally testified against high school, but dissented as to Wallace Miller and Adin Yutzy because the record never established their children's own wishes, and he would have sent the case back for hearings on that point.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied a balancing approach: a State's interest in universal education, however important, is not absolute, and must yield when it collides with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment unless the State shows an interest 'of the highest order' that outweighs the religious claim.
  2. Before weighing that interest, the Court first asked whether the Amish objection was truly religious rather than merely personal preference — contrasting it with Thoreau's personal, philosophical rejection of society, which would not qualify for First Amendment protection.
  3. Finding the Amish objection genuinely religious — rooted in a centuries-old faith that treats separation from worldly influence as essential to salvation — the Court held that compulsory high school attendance would substantially interfere with that religious practice and the integration of Amish children into their community.
  4. Weighing the State's stated interests (preparing citizens for self-government and self-sufficiency) against the evidence, the Court found the Amish already achieved those goals through their own vocational training and centuries of self-sufficient, law-abiding community life, so one or two extra years of formal schooling added little.
  5. The Court distinguished the State's reliance on Prince v. Massachusetts, a case allowing government to override religious conduct for the sake of a child's welfare, because there was no evidence here that forgoing extra high school would harm the Amish children's health or safety.
  6. Concluding that the State's interest in compulsory education for these additional years did not rise to the level needed to override the religious claim, the Court held that requiring high school attendance beyond eighth grade against the Amish parents' religious objection violated the Free Exercise Clause.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

First Amendment Free Exercise Clause

Protects people's right to practice their religion without undue government interference.

Fourteenth Amendment

Applies First Amendment protections, including free exercise of religion, against state governments.

Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law (Wis. Stat. § 118.15)

State law requiring children to attend school until age 16, at issue in this case.

Cases affected by this decision

Distinguishes Prince v. Massachusetts (321 U.S. 158)

The Court said Prince did not control here because no harm to a child's health or safety was shown.

Reaffirms Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510)

The Court relied on Pierce as still-good law establishing parents' right to direct their children's upbringing and education.

Reaffirms Sherbert v. Verner (374 U.S. 398)

The Court used Sherbert's rule that even neutral laws can unconstitutionally burden free exercise in application.

Supreme Court Opinion

Ask GovernmentReporter about this case

Ask anything about the majority, concurrences, or dissents.

Wisconsin v. Yoder | SCOTUS Reporter