Hencely v. Fluor Corp.
The Supreme Court ruled that a former soldier can take his state-law negligence claims against a defense contractor to court, rejecting a sweeping rule that all tort suits against military contractors in combat zones are automatically blocked.
The decision rolls back an expansive 'battlefield preemption' doctrine used by lower courts, holding that contractors who deviate from — rather than follow — military instructions cannot use federal law as a shield against accountability.
How it got here: A federal district court granted summary judgment for Fluor on preemption grounds; the Fourth Circuit affirmed under its "battlefield preemption" doctrine; Hencely asked the Supreme Court to hear the case, and it agreed.
The Case in Depth
What happened
In 2016, Ahmad Nayeb — a Taliban operative hired by Fluor Corporation's subcontractor to work at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan under the military's "Afghan First" program — detonated a suicide vest on the base. Army Specialist Winston Hencely, then 20, intervened and suffered a fractured skull and permanent brain injuries. The Army's own investigation found Fluor primarily responsible, concluding the company failed to escort Nayeb, allowed him unsupervised roaming, and let him obtain tools used to build the bomb — all in violation of base security requirements Fluor had contractually agreed to follow.
The question before the Court
Can a soldier injured in a Taliban attack on a U.S. base sue the defense contractor whose negligent supervision allowed the attacker access — even when the contractor's failures were not authorized and actually violated military instructions?
The Court's answer
No — Hencely's state-law claims are not preempted. The Fourth Circuit's rule — that any tort suit against a military contractor arising from wartime combat activities is automatically blocked — has no foundation in the Constitution, any federal statute, or the Supreme Court's prior decisions. Federal law only overrides state law when there is a genuine conflict between the two, and that conflict must be traceable to a specific constitutional provision, statute, or treaty. None of those sources expressly bars this suit.
The key precedent the lower court relied on — Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) — protects contractors only when the government directed them to do the very thing the plaintiff is challenging. Here the opposite is true: the military's own investigation found that Fluor violated express contractual duties. A contractor who could have complied with both its federal contract and state negligence law, and allegedly chose not to, faces no conflict that federal law must resolve. The Yearsley doctrine, which shields contractors for faithfully carrying out government orders, similarly does not apply when the contractor acted outside its granted authority.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Wounded veterans and others injured by defense contractors in war zones may now pursue state-law negligence claims, at least when the contractor's conduct violated rather than followed military orders. Defense contractors operating overseas can no longer rely on a blanket legal shield simply because they work in a combat setting — they remain subject to ordinary tort accountability for unauthorized misconduct.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts to be decided on the merits. Hencely's negligence claims — for negligent supervision, negligent entrustment of tools, and negligent retention of Nayeb — can now proceed. The Court left open which law governs on remand: South Carolina's choice-of-law rules might point to Afghan law, since the injury occurred in Afghanistan, and that unresolved question will have to be addressed before trial.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not decide whether Fluor was actually negligent, or whether South Carolina or Afghan law applies on remand. It also does not address whether a different preemption theory might succeed on other facts — for instance, when a contractor is sued for conduct the military expressly ordered it to perform.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (6). Justice Thomas (author), joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson.
Dissent (3). Justice Alito (author), joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh.
Dissent — Justice Alito
Justice Alito argued that the Constitution itself — not any statute — preempts this suit, because the power to wage war is assigned exclusively to the federal government and cannot be intruded upon by state (or foreign) tort law. He warned that the trial proceedings will likely force courts and juries to second-guess military decisions about the Afghan First program and base security at Bagram, require discovery of sensitive national-security documents, and potentially be decided under Afghan law as it existed in 2016. In his view, war is an exclusively federal domain, and state tort law has no role to play in it. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the Supremacy Clause baseline: state law must yield to federal law only when a genuine conflict exists, and that conflict must stem from the Constitution's text, a valid federal statute, or a treaty — not from a court's general sense that federal interests are at stake. Without an identifiable legal source for preemption, the analysis goes no further.
- No statute expressly preempts Hencely's suit. The Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception (28 U.S.C. §2680(j)) preserves the federal government's own immunity for war-related claims but does not extend to private contractors — the Court had already said so in United States v. Orleans (1976), and even the dissent agreed on this point.
- The Fourth Circuit relied on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988), which allows federal courts to displace state law in narrow 'uniquely federal interest' areas — but only when there is a 'significant conflict' between state law and an identifiable federal policy. Crucially, Boyle protects a contractor only when the government directed it to do the very thing the plaintiff is challenging.
- That condition is not met here. The Army's own investigation concluded Fluor violated its contractual duties — failing to escort Nayeb, allowing him unsupervised access for nearly an hour, and letting him obtain unauthorized tools used to build the bomb. Because Fluor could have complied with both its military contract and state negligence law simultaneously, there is no 'significant conflict' that justifies displacing state law.
- The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution's war powers clauses — which give Congress and the President broad authority over military affairs and expressly exclude states from waging war — implicitly bar all war-related tort suits. Historical precedent shows tort suits arising from wartime conduct have always been allowed absent a specific statutory bar, and federal contractors do not automatically inherit the government's immunity simply by doing business with it.
- Finally, the Yearsley doctrine — which shields contractors from liability when they are sued for faithfully executing government directives — does not apply because Fluor is alleged to have acted outside, not within, its authorized authority. The Court declined to extend Yearsley beyond its own terms.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (487 U.S. 500)
Boyle protects contractors only when the government directed the challenged conduct, not when contractors acted contrary to military instructions.
Distinguishes Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co. (309 U.S. 18)
Yearsley shields contractors only for faithfully executing government orders; it does not apply when the contractor exceeded its authority.