Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment
The Court threw out a $1 billion copyright verdict against internet provider Cox Communications, ruling that knowing some customers used its service to pirate music was not enough — on its own — to make Cox legally responsible for that piracy.
The decision limits the legal tools music labels and other copyright owners have to pressure internet providers into cutting off customers who repeatedly steal content, placing the burden of chasing individual pirates back on the copyright holders.
How it got here: A federal district court jury awarded Sony $1 billion; the Fourth Circuit affirmed on contributory liability but reversed on vicarious liability; Cox asked the Supreme Court to review the contributory liability ruling and the Court agreed to hear it.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Cox Communications, one of the country's largest internet providers, received over 163,000 notices from Sony Music and other major record labels identifying subscriber accounts linked to music piracy. Cox sent warnings and suspended some accounts but kept most users connected. Sony sued Cox rather than the individual pirates, arguing that Cox's decision to keep serving known infringers made Cox itself legally responsible. A jury agreed and awarded Sony $1 billion.
The question before the Court
Can an internet service provider be held legally responsible for its customers' music piracy just because the provider knew those customers were using its service to infringe copyrights and kept providing access anyway?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that an internet service provider cannot be held responsible for its customers' copyright violations simply because it knew those customers were using their connections to pirate music. To be contributorily liable — meaning responsible for someone else's infringement — a provider must have intended for its service to be used for infringement. That intent can only be shown in two ways: by actively encouraging customers to infringe (Cox did the opposite, sending warnings and suspending accounts), or by offering a service so specifically designed for piracy that it has no substantial legitimate uses (internet access, by contrast, is used for countless lawful purposes).
The Court also rejected Sony's argument that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe-harbor provision — which shields providers who terminate repeat infringers — implied that providers face liability for knowingly serving infringers. The DMCA creates new defenses from liability; it does not create new liability where none would otherwise exist.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Internet providers can continue serving customers even when they receive notices that specific accounts are being used for piracy, as long as the provider isn't actively promoting infringement or designing its service for it. Music labels and film studios lose a powerful lever to force ISPs to police their networks, and a federal safe-harbor provision Congress built to incentivize ISP cooperation may now have little practical effect.
What changes now
The case is sent back to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with the ruling. Because the Court found Cox not contributorily liable, the $1 billion jury verdict is undone. The Fourth Circuit had already reversed the vicarious liability verdict, so Cox faces no remaining damages exposure from this lawsuit. Copyright holders must rely on suing individual infringers directly or seeking legislative changes to compel ISPs to take stronger action against piracy on their networks.
What this does not decide
The majority does not address whether a common-law "aiding and abetting" theory could ever impose secondary copyright liability on an internet provider. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence argues the majority wrongly closed that door; the majority's holding is limited to the two recognized contributory-liability tests.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (7). Justice Thomas (author), joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice Kagan, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett.
Separate writings (2). Justice Sotomayor (author of a concurrence), joined by Justice Jackson.
Concurrence — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor agreed Cox is not liable on these facts but wrote separately to criticize the majority for unnecessarily limiting secondary copyright liability to just two recognized theories. She argued that prior Court decisions in Sony and Grokster left open a common-law aiding-and-abetting theory, and the majority ignored that opening without explanation. She would have assessed Cox's conduct under aiding-and-abetting principles, but still concluded Cox lacked the required intent because it does not know which specific individuals on any given connection are actually committing infringement — a knowledge gap that is fatal to imposing liability. Read the full concurrence →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the baseline rule that the Copyright Act does not expressly make anyone responsible for someone else's infringement. Courts have recognized two specific forms of 'contributory liability' — legal responsibility for another person's copyright violation — drawn from pre-existing common law: actively inducing infringement, or selling a product or service designed specifically for infringement with no substantial legitimate uses.
- For the inducement test, a provider must actively encourage infringement through specific acts — the way file-sharing software companies in the 2005 Grokster case advertised their product as a tool to download pirated music and built their entire business model around infringement. Cox did the opposite: it sent warnings, suspended service, and terminated accounts in response to infringement notices. Sony presented no evidence of any promotion or marketing of Cox's service as useful for piracy.
- For the 'tailored-to-infringement' test, drawn from the 1984 Sony Betamax case, a service qualifies only if it is incapable of substantial or commercially significant lawful uses — if it is, in effect, 'good for nothing else' but piracy. Cox's internet service is used for email, streaming, video calls, shopping, work, and countless other legal activities. Cox did not make any special modifications to facilitate piracy.
- The Court reaffirmed that mere knowledge that a service will sometimes be used to infringe has never been enough to establish contributory liability under any of this Court's precedents. From the 1911 Kalem case through Sony and Grokster, the Court has consistently said that a seller's knowledge that some buyers will misuse a product does not, standing alone, make the seller liable.
- The Court rejected Sony's argument that the DMCA safe harbor — which protects providers who adopt policies to cut off repeat infringers — must presuppose that providers face liability when they keep serving known infringers. The DMCA creates a new shield from liability; it does not itself impose liability. Congress expressly stated that failing to qualify for the safe harbor cannot be used against a provider who argues its conduct was not infringing to begin with.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (545 U.S. 913)
Reaffirmed as setting the two-part framework for contributory copyright liability — inducement and tailored-to-infringement.
Reaffirms Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (464 U.S. 417)
Reaffirmed as establishing that a product capable of substantial lawful uses cannot be the basis for contributory infringement.