Tooahnippah v. Hickel
Headline: Allows courts to review Interior Department refusals of Native Americans’ wills and blocks agency disapproval here, restoring the niece’s inheritance and limiting agency power over wills.
Holding: The Court held that the Interior Department’s decision to disapprove an Indian’s will is subject to federal-court review and that the Regional Solicitor’s disapproval here was arbitrary, so the will must be approved and enforced.
- Allows federal courts to review Interior decisions rejecting Indian wills.
- Limits agency power to overturn rational testamentary choices.
- Restores inheritance when a will is valid and lacks fraud or incapacity.
Summary
Background
George Chahsenah, a Comanche man who died owning restricted allotment interests, executed a will leaving his property to a niece and her children. An Examiner of Inheritance found the will properly executed and the testator competent. The testator’s putative daughter, Dorita High Horse, contested the will. The Regional Solicitor, acting for the Secretary of the Interior, set aside the Examiner’s approval, disapproved the will under 25 U.S.C. § 373 as not "just and equitable," and ordered intestate distribution to the daughter.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court first held that the Secretary’s approval or disapproval under § 373 is subject to judicial review. The Court then reviewed the Regional Solicitor’s decision on the record and found it arbitrary and capricious because the Regional Solicitor substituted his personal view of fairness for the testator’s rational testamentary choice, despite the Examiner’s unchallenged findings of proper execution and testamentary capacity.
Real world impact
The Court reversed and directed the lower courts to reinstate the District Court judgment approving the will and ordering distribution according to its terms. The decision makes clear that Interior officials cannot lightly disapprove an otherwise valid will simply because they judge the result unfair; disapproval must rest on demonstrable problems like fraud, undue influence, lack of capacity, or other clear statutory grounds. This ruling applies to similar cases disposing of restricted Indian property, but it does not spell out every limit on agency discretion.
Dissents or concurrances
Justices Harlan and Hablan concurred, agreeing review is required and elaborating that disapproval is improper where a will is rational and free of fraud, undue influence, or clear public-policy defects.
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