Benton v. Maryland
The Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy applies to state criminal trials through the Fourteenth Amendment, and it threw out a man's larceny conviction because he had already been acquitted of that charge at an earlier trial.
In reaching that result, the Court overruled its 1937 decision in Palko v. Connecticut, which had allowed states more leeway on double jeopardy than the federal government, continuing a series of rulings applying Bill of Rights protections directly to the states.
“Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko v. Connecticut is overruled.”
The Court's central holding applying double jeopardy protections to the states.
How it got here: Maryland's Court of Special Appeals rejected the double jeopardy claim on the merits, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and later scheduled reargument on an added question.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A Maryland man was tried for burglary and larceny; a jury acquitted him of larceny but convicted him of burglary. After a Maryland Court of Appeals ruling invalidated the jury-selection process used in his case, he chose to be re-indicted and retried. At the second trial he was convicted of both burglary and larceny, even though he had already been acquitted of larceny once before.
The question before the Court
Does the Constitution's ban on being tried twice for the same crime apply in state courts, not just federal ones?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court held that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, overruling its earlier decision in Palko v. Connecticut, which had let states get away with looser double-jeopardy protections than the federal government. Because this guarantee is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," the same rule now applies whether a state or the federal government is prosecuting someone.
Applying that rule here, the Court found the man's larceny conviction could not stand: he had already been acquitted of larceny at his first trial, and appealing his separate burglary conviction could not force him to give up that acquittal and be retried for larceny anyway. The Court also sent the case back so Maryland's courts could examine whether his burglary conviction was tainted by evidence improperly admitted at the joint retrial.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
State prosecutors nationwide can no longer retry someone on a charge a jury already acquitted them of, even if that person successfully appeals a different, related conviction. The ruling also removes a legal option state courts had relied on for decades — treating double jeopardy protections as looser than the federal standard — bringing every state in line with one uniform national rule.
What changes now
The larceny conviction is reversed outright. The burglary conviction is not decided on the merits here — the case goes back to the Maryland courts to determine whether evidence improperly admitted because of the joint retrial for larceny and burglary affected the burglary verdict. This is a final ruling on the double jeopardy question, though the burglary conviction's fate remains open on remand.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the burglary conviction itself was tainted by evidence that would have been inadmissible in a burglary-only trial — that question goes back to Maryland's courts. It also expressly left open whether the concurrent sentence doctrine retains any continuing validity as a discretionary rule of judicial convenience.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice White
Justice White agreed with the Court's double jeopardy holding and with rejecting a jurisdictional bar, but wrote separately to defend the concurrent sentence doctrine as a sound practice of judicial efficiency rather than mere convenience to judges. He argued courts should generally skip review of redundant counts unless a defendant can show real, concrete harm from the unreviewed conviction, at which point relief could still be available later.
Dissent — Justice Harlan
“I consider that the concurrent sentence doctrine is applicable here, and that dismissal of the writ is accordingly called for.”Harlan's core objection that the Court should have avoided the constitutional question.
Justice Harlan argued the Court should have applied the concurrent sentence doctrine and dismissed the case without reaching the double jeopardy question, accusing the majority of reaching out to decide a major constitutional issue it did not need to resolve. He also argued that the long march of 'selectively incorporating' Bill of Rights provisions against the states lacks support in history or reason, and that under the older Palko due-process approach, the man's retrial for larceny would still be unconstitutional but on narrower grounds.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed a jurisdictional puzzle raised by the 'concurrent sentence doctrine' — the practice of skipping review of a conviction when a person is already serving an equally long or longer sentence on another, valid conviction. The Court held this doctrine does not strip federal courts of jurisdiction; it is at most a discretionary rule of convenience, because collateral consequences of an unreviewed conviction (such as its later use to increase a sentence or impeach a witness) can still create a live, non-moot controversy.
- Applying that reasoning here, the Court found the larceny conviction was not moot, since it could someday be used against the man under a habitual-offender law or to attack his credibility, and since Maryland's own courts had already chosen to rule on the double jeopardy question rather than skip it.
- Turning to the merits, the Court examined its 1937 decision in Palko v. Connecticut, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment only barred double jeopardy practices that were shockingly unfair, not the full federal standard. The Court noted it had increasingly abandoned this 'watered-down' approach in favor of applying Bill of Rights guarantees to the states in full once a guarantee is found 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'
- Because the prohibition on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal tradition and is guaranteed in some form by every state, the Court concluded it qualifies as such a fundamental guarantee, requiring full application of federal double jeopardy standards against the states.
- Applying full federal double jeopardy standards, the Court found that conditioning an appeal of one conviction on giving up a valid acquittal on another charge is itself a forbidden forfeiture, rejecting Maryland's argument that a defective original indictment made the earlier acquittal legally meaningless.
- Because the larceny acquittal could not be undone, and because it was unclear whether the burglary conviction was legally affected by evidence introduced only because of the improper retrial on larceny, the Court concluded the burglary question needed further review by Maryland's own courts before it could be resolved.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Overrules Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319)
Overruled to the extent it let states apply a weaker double jeopardy standard than the federal government.
Reaffirms United States v. Ball (163 U.S. 662)
Relied on as still-good law to reject Maryland's argument that a defective indictment erased the earlier acquittal.
Reaffirms Green v. United States (355 U.S. 184)
Applied to hold that appealing one conviction cannot force forfeiture of double jeopardy protection on another.