Jenkins v. Delaware

1969-06-02

Headline: Court refused to apply Miranda warnings to retrials of cases first tried before Miranda, allowing prosecutors to use pre‑Miranda in‑custody statements at post‑Miranda retrials and affirming Delaware’s result.

Holding: Miranda's rules for admitting in‑custody statements do not apply to retrials of defendants whose original trials began before June 13, 1966, and the Delaware judgment is affirmed.

Real World Impact:

Allows prosecutors to use pre‑Miranda in‑custody statements at retrials of pre‑Miranda cases.
Leaves defendants able to challenge statements using voluntariness tests instead of Miranda warnings.
States may choose to apply Miranda protections even when Court does not require it.

Topics: Miranda rights, police interrogation, retrial rules, retroactivity of new rules

Summary

Background

The case involves a man arrested in March 1965 on suspicion of murder who was questioned several times without being told he could have a state‑paid lawyer. He gave an incriminating statement, was tried in January 1966, convicted, and sentenced to death. While his appeal was pending this Court decided Miranda and Johnson. Delaware reversed on other grounds but ruled the earlier statement could be used at a retrial. A 1967 retrial produced a conviction for second‑degree murder and life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed.

Reasoning

The Court considered whether Miranda’s rules about admitting statements made in custody must be applied at retrials of cases whose original trials began before June 13, 1966. The majority focused on earlier decisions about when new constitutional rules apply going forward, the practical reliance by police and prosecutors on earlier practices, and the heavy evidentiary burden that applying Miranda to retrials would create. The Court held Miranda does not apply to retrials in such situations and noted defendants still can challenge statements under the older voluntariness test.

Real world impact

As a result, defendants whose first trials began before June 13, 1966, generally cannot force exclusion of pre‑Miranda in‑custody statements at later retrials under Miranda; states may nonetheless choose to give Miranda warnings. The ruling affects prosecutions that depend on older investigations and previously admitted statements, making it harder for some retried defendants to exclude those statements.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented for reasons he had stated earlier. Justice Harlan dissented separately, arguing the trial/retrial distinction was unjustified and that this defendant, whose case was not final when Miranda was decided, should have received Miranda’s protections.