Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

1968-06-17

Headline: Racial refusals to sell or rent are blocked as the Court holds the 1866 law bars private housing discrimination, letting Black buyers seek court orders against developers and private sellers nationwide.

Holding: The Court held that the 1866 civil‑rights law (42 U.S.C. §1982) prohibits racial refusals to sell or rent by private people or companies, and that Congress can enforce this rule under the Thirteenth Amendment.

Real World Impact:

Lets Black buyers seek court injunctions against private sellers who refuse sales because of race.
Allows federal courts to block private housing discrimination by injunction.
Clarifies §1982 covers race discrimination but lacks detailed federal enforcement mechanisms.

Topics: housing discrimination, race and housing, fair housing law, Thirteenth Amendment

Summary

Background

A Black couple tried to buy a home in the Paddock Woods subdivision but the developer refused to sell because of race. They sued in federal court on September 2, 1965, relying on the 1866 statute now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and asked for an injunction and other relief. The District Court dismissed their complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed, prompting Supreme Court review.

Reasoning

The central question was whether the 1866 law bars purely private racial refusals to sell or rent, and whether Congress could enforce that rule under the Thirteenth Amendment. The majority looked at the statute’s plain language and detailed legislative history from 1866 and 1870, and concluded Congress meant to protect the right to buy and hold property from racially motivated denials by private people or companies. The Court held that § 1982 reaches private as well as public discrimination and is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment.

Real world impact

Under this decision, people who are refused sale or rental of housing because of race can seek federal court orders to prevent that discrimination. The opinion notes § 1982 is narrower than the 1968 fair-housing law: it covers only race and lacks the detailed administrative enforcement, explicit damage provisions, and broader categories found in the 1968 Act. Courts can grant injunctions under § 1982, but the statute does not itself spell out federal agency enforcement or explicit damages.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Harlan (joined by Justice White) dissented, arguing the 1866 statute should be read as reaching only state- or community-sanctioned discrimination and suggesting the Court should have declined decision because the 1968 Act would address fair housing concerns.