United States v. Brown
The Supreme Court struck down a federal law that made it a crime for any member of the Communist Party to serve as a labor union officer, ruling that Congress had singled out a named group for punishment instead of writing a general rule for courts to apply.
The decision affirms that the Constitution's ban on 'bills of attainder' stops Congress from itself deciding, without a trial, that a specific group of people should be punished — that job belongs to courts, not legislators.
“We agree that § 504 is void as a bill of attainder and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that basis.”
The Court's central holding that the labor law provision is an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
How it got here: A federal trial court convicted the union officer; the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed on First and Fifth Amendment grounds; the government sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A San Francisco longshoreman and open Communist Party member was elected to his union's executive board for three consecutive years. Federal law made it a crime for Communist Party members to serve as labor union officers, aiming to prevent politically motivated strikes. He was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to six months in prison, even though no one claimed he had ever proposed or supported a political strike.
The question before the Court
Could Congress make it a crime for any Communist Party member to serve as a labor union officer, without a court ever deciding whether that particular person was dangerous?
Why it matters
The ruling protects union members and officers from being disqualified from their jobs based solely on group membership decided by Congress, rather than through individualized judicial proceedings. It also limits how far Congress can go in targeting named political groups for exclusion from jobs or benefits, reinforcing that such determinations must go through courts, not direct legislative fiat.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, not subject to further proceedings beyond the Ninth Circuit's judgment being affirmed. The invalidated provision could no longer be enforced against union officials based on Communist Party membership. Congress retained the ability to address concerns about union leadership and political strikes, but would need to write general rules applied by courts rather than naming a specific group. The decision left the First and Fifth Amendment questions raised below unaddressed.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Congress can ever exclude dangerous individuals from union leadership, nor did it reach the First or Fifth Amendment arguments raised below. It also did not rule on whether Communist Party members are in fact likely to cause political strikes — only that Congress could not make that determination itself without a judicial process.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice White
“the Court's per se approach cuts too broadly and invalidates legitimate legislative activity.”White's core objection that the majority's new test would strike down many ordinary regulatory statutes.
Justice White argued the majority abandoned the traditional multi-factor test for identifying bills of attainder in favor of a rigid rule based purely on how narrowly a law designates a class. He contended the law was a reasonable, rational regulation aimed at preventing political strikes, comparable to accepted conflict-of-interest and felon-disqualification statutes, and that it reflected a preventive rather than punitive purpose. He would have upheld the law as valid economic regulation, not an unconstitutional legislative punishment.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that the Bill of Attainder Clause bars Congress from passing laws that punish specific, named or easily identifiable people or groups without a judicial trial, because that fact-finding role belongs to courts, not legislatures.
- The Court distinguished between a 'generally applicable rule' — one that describes conduct or characteristics and leaves courts to determine who fits it — and a law that directly names the group to be punished, which usurps the judicial function.
- Applying this distinction, the Court found that the challenged provision did not describe conduct like inciting political strikes; instead, it directly designated Communist Party members as the disqualified group, leaving no fact-finding role for courts.
- The Court rejected the argument that banking-law conflict-of-interest rules were comparable, reasoning that those rules set an objective, general standard of conduct applicable to anyone in a certain financial position, rather than naming a specific political group.
- The Court also rejected the idea that only retributive purposes count as 'punishment,' holding that preventive measures directed at a named group can also be punishment under the Clause, since punishment includes deterrent and preventive aims, not just retribution.
- Because the law disqualified Communist Party members by name rather than by a rule of general applicability describing dangerous conduct, the Court concluded Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority by performing an adjudicative function reserved to courts.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes American Communications Assn. v. Douds (339 U.S. 382)
The Court said this case upholding a similar Communist-disqualification law is not necessarily controlling here.
Reaffirms United States v. Lovett (328 U.S. 303)
The Court relied on this precedent striking down a law targeting named federal employees as still good law.