Lamont v. Postmaster General
The Supreme Court struck down a federal law that let the government hold back unsealed foreign mail labeled "communist political propaganda" unless the addressee filled out a card asking for it. The Court ruled this requirement violated the First Amendment rights of the people who wanted to receive the mail.
The decision established that the First Amendment protects not just the right to speak or publish, but also the right to receive information and ideas — meaning the government cannot make people jump through hoops before letting them read material simply because officials disapprove of its political content.
“The regime of this Act is at war with the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment.”
The Court's closing statement on why the mail-detention scheme violated free speech principles.
How it got here: Lamont's suit was dismissed as moot by a three-judge district court; Heilberg's suit succeeded on the merits before a different three-judge court; both sides appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A 1962 federal law let the Post Office hold foreign, unsealed mail that Customs officials labeled "communist political propaganda" unless the addressee mailed back a card asking for it. Dr. Corliss Lamont, a publisher, and another addressee named Heilberg each had mail detained under this system and sued, arguing the requirement violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.
The question before the Court
Could Congress require people to formally ask the Post Office, in writing, before it would deliver foreign mail the government labeled "communist political propaganda"?
Why it matters
People who wanted to read foreign political material no longer had to identify themselves to the government and request delivery of each item, a step likely to scare off people worried about their jobs, security clearances, or reputations. The ruling protects Americans' ability to receive controversial or unpopular ideas from abroad without government-created friction.
What changes now
This was a final decision on the merits resolving both consolidated appeals. The judgment against Lamont was reversed and the judgment for Heilberg was affirmed, meaning the reply-card detention scheme could no longer be enforced against either party or, as a practical matter, against anyone else under the same statute. No further proceedings were ordered.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide how far Congress may go in classifying mail or setting postage rates, whether the "communist political propaganda" labeling standard itself could survive constitutional scrutiny, or Customs' authority to inspect incoming material for contraband. It also did not address the First Amendment rights of the foreign senders.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Goldberg, agreed with the majority but grounded the ruling explicitly in a free-standing 'right to receive' publications, which he argued is implicit in the Bill of Rights even though not textually stated. He stressed that even a minor or merely inconvenient burden on First Amendment rights is still constitutionally intolerable, and that the government's professed interest in avoiding a one-sided propaganda subsidy could not justify the intrusion.
Concurrence — Justice Harlan
Justice Harlan concurred only in the judgment, agreeing with the outcome on the reasoning laid out in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion rather than joining Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first cleared away a mootness problem: because the Post Office had changed its practice to require a fresh written request for every single piece of mail rather than keeping a standing list, there was no longer any dispute about whether the case was moot, leaving only the constitutional question.
- The Court then framed the core problem as an affirmative burden on the reader: the law forced an addressee to perform a specific official act — mailing back a reply card — before the government would release mail addressed to that very person, even though nothing else stood in the way of delivery.
- Drawing on earlier cases striking down licensing and registration requirements imposed as a precondition to exercising First Amendment rights (such as a flat tax on distributing literature and a registration requirement for union organizers before speaking), the Court treated this reply-card system as the same kind of precondition, just imposed on receiving rather than speaking.
- The Court reasoned that requiring this affirmative step was inherently likely to deter people, especially those in sensitive jobs or without job security, from ever requesting mail the government had branded as propaganda, chilling their willingness to receive information at all.
- Because the scheme conditioned delivery of mail on the addressee's official request, the Court held it to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's own First Amendment rights, without needing to decide broader questions about Congress's power over the mail or the propriety of the underlying labeling standard.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Murdock v. Pennsylvania (319 U.S. 105)
Relied on as precedent striking down a flat license tax on exercising First Amendment rights.
Reaffirms Thomas v. Collins (323 U.S. 516)
Relied on as precedent striking down a registration requirement before a union speech.
Reaffirms Lovell v. Griffin (303 U.S. 444)
Relied on as precedent invalidating a municipal licensing system for distributing literature.