Malloy v. Hogan
The Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination applies to state governments just as it applies to the federal government, and it freed a man Connecticut had jailed for refusing to answer an investigator's questions.
The decision extended a growing line of cases applying Bill of Rights protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and it meant that state and federal courts must now use the identical legal test for deciding when someone can lawfully refuse to answer questions that might incriminate them.
“We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.”
The Court's central holding applying the Fifth Amendment privilege to the states.
How it got here: A Connecticut trial court denied Malloy's habeas corpus petition, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
William Malloy pleaded guilty to a gambling-related misdemeanor in Hartford, Connecticut, and was serving probation when he was later summoned to testify before a court-appointed referee investigating gambling in the county. He refused to answer several questions about the people connected to his earlier arrest, saying the answers might incriminate him, and a Connecticut court held him in contempt and jailed him until he agreed to answer.
The question before the Court
Could Connecticut jail a man for refusing to answer questions in a state investigation, when a federal court could not have jailed him for the same refusal?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee makes the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination binding on the states, not just the federal government. That meant Connecticut had to use the same legal test federal courts use when deciding whether a witness can refuse to answer a potentially incriminating question, rather than a looser state standard.
Applying that federal test to Malloy's situation, the Court found his refusal to answer questions about his gambling arrest and associates was justified, because truthful answers could plausibly have connected him to ongoing or more recent criminal activity. So Connecticut's contempt order jailing him for silence violated his constitutional rights, and the judgment against him was reversed.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People questioned by state investigators, grand juries, or police now have the same right to remain silent that federal witnesses have long enjoyed, and states must apply the exact same legal test the federal courts use. State prosecutors and courts can no longer use a looser standard to force testimony that could expose someone to criminal charges.
What changes now
The ruling is a final decision on the merits, reversing the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors and freeing Malloy from the contempt order. Because the Court applied a nationwide standard, state courts everywhere had to start evaluating self-incrimination claims by witnesses using the same test federal courts use, ending the practice of applying a looser standard in state proceedings.
What this does not decide
The Court did not adopt a rule that every provision of the Bill of Rights automatically applies to the states; it decided only that the specific privilege against self-incrimination does, and it deliberately avoided endorsing wholesale incorporation of all eight amendments, a point the dissent strongly contested.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Douglas
Justice Douglas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to note that he continued to adhere to his broader view, expressed in his Gideon v. Wainwright concurrence, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the protections in the Bill of Rights, not just the ones the Court addresses case by case.
Dissent — Justice Harlan
Justice Harlan argued the majority was really adopting wholesale incorporation of federal Bill of Rights doctrine while claiming not to, and that this ignored real differences between state and federal criminal justice systems. He contended due process requires only a fundamental-fairness inquiry, not automatic application of federal rules, and that Connecticut's courts had carefully and fairly applied their own standard.
Dissent — Justice White
Justice White accepted that the same federal standard for incrimination should apply, but argued the majority was, in practice, letting any witness claim the privilege automatically without genuine judicial scrutiny. He believed that under a properly applied federal standard, Malloy's refusals to answer were not privileged because there was no realistic danger of prosecution.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the doctrine of selective incorporation — deciding case by case whether a specific Bill of Rights protection binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause — noting it had already extended this approach to First Amendment speech and religion rights, Fourth Amendment search protections, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
- It traced a parallel line of cases on coerced confessions, which had gradually adopted the same voluntariness test used in federal courts, reflecting that the American system requires the government to prove guilt with its own evidence rather than by forcing a suspect to talk.
- Building on its recent ruling applying the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states, the Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination is a basic principle of free government rather than a mere technical rule of evidence, so it must bind the states as well.
- Concluding it would be inconsistent to protect people differently depending on whether they face state or federal questioning, the Court held that the identical federal legal test must govern claims of the privilege in both settings.
- Applying that federal test to the specific questions Malloy was asked, the Court found that truthful answers could realistically have linked him to more recent, still-prosecutable criminal activity, which is enough to support a valid claim of privilege.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Overrules Twining v. New Jersey (211 U.S. 78)
Rejects its holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not bind the states.
Overrules Adamson v. California (332 U.S. 46)
Rejects its view that the privilege against self-incrimination was not enforceable against states.
Reaffirms Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643)
Relies on its reasoning that constitutional privacy and self-incrimination protections bind the states.