Wesberry v. Sanders
The Supreme Court ruled that Georgia's congressional map, unchanged since 1931, violated the Constitution because one district held nearly three times the population of another, giving some voters far less say in choosing their representative than others.
The decision established that congressional districts within a state must be drawn as equal in population as practicable, launching a wave of congressional redistricting nationwide and cementing what later became known as the 'one person, one vote' principle.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court found Georgia's districts grossly unequal but dismissed the case for lack of equity; the voters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Voters in Fulton County, Georgia, lived in the state's Fifth Congressional District, a fast-growing area around Atlanta that had swelled to 823,680 people under a 1931 state law creating Georgia's ten congressional districts. Meanwhile, the state's Ninth District held only 272,154 people. Because each district elected just one member of Congress, the voters argued their votes counted for far less than votes cast in smaller districts, and they sued Georgia's governor and secretary of state to strike down the outdated map.
The question before the Court
Could Georgia keep using congressional district lines drawn in 1931, even though one district had grown to nearly three times the population of another?
The Court's answer
No — the Constitution requires that, as nearly as practicable, congressional districts within a state have equal populations, so that one person's vote counts as much as another's. The Court found this rule embedded in Article I, Section 2, which says the House is chosen "by the People," read in light of Constitutional Convention debates showing the delegates meant the House to represent people directly and equally, unlike the Senate.
Because Georgia's Fifth District had grown to more than twice the average district size and nearly three times the size of the smallest district, its 1931 map violated this rule. The Court sent the case back to the district court to work out the right remedy, without ruling on the separate Fourteenth Amendment claims the voters had also raised.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Because many states at the time had similarly unequal, decades-old congressional maps, this ruling forced widespread redistricting across the country. It strengthened the voting power of residents in fast-growing cities and suburbs who had been outvoted by sparsely populated rural districts, and it confirmed that federal courts could strike down unequal maps rather than leaving the problem entirely to state legislatures or Congress.
What changes now
The case returns to the three-judge federal district court, which must decide on an appropriate remedy in light of the Supreme Court's ruling. This is a final decision on the constitutional question -- that congressional districts within a state must be roughly equal in population -- though the specific redistricting remedy for Georgia, and the timing of any new map, is left for further proceedings in the lower court.
What this does not decide
The Court decided the case only under Article I, Section 2, and expressly declined to rule on the voters' separate claims that Georgia's map also violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Clark
Justice Clark agreed that congressional districting is subject to judicial review and that the case should be reversed and remanded, but he rejected the majority's reliance on Article I, Section 2, agreeing instead with Harlan that this provision does not lay down a 'one person, one vote' rule. He would have examined Georgia's districts under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause using the standards from Baker v. Carr, and suggested relief be deferred if Georgia's legislature seemed likely to reapportion itself.
Dissent — Justice Harlan
“The constitutional right which the Court creates is manufactured out of whole cloth.”Harlan's central objection that the majority invented a right not found in the Constitution's text or history.
Justice Harlan argued that Article I, Sections 2, 4, and 5, and the historical record show the Constitution left congressional districting entirely to state legislatures, subject only to oversight by Congress, with no judicially enforceable equal-population requirement. He warned the ruling endangered the seats of nearly all sitting Representatives, contended the majority misread the Convention debates, and noted Congress had deliberately dropped an equal-population requirement in 1929. He would have affirmed dismissal of the complaint.
Dissent in part — Justice Stewart
Justice Stewart joined Harlan's dissent on the merits, agreeing that Article I, Section 2, gives courts no mandate to require equal-population congressional districts. But he disagreed with any suggestion that such claims are not justiciable, maintaining that courts do have power to grant relief in cases like this even though he ultimately voted to affirm the dismissal here.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first addressed whether courts could even hear this kind of challenge, relying on Baker v. Carr's holding that claims about unequal legislative districts present a justiciable question a court can decide, rather than a 'political question' reserved to the other branches.
- The Court then turned to Article I, Section 2, which says the House of Representatives 'shall be composed of Members chosen ... by the People of the several States,' and read that phrase in light of the history of the 1787 Constitutional Convention.
- Tracing the Convention debates, the Court found that the delegates who created a two-house Congress deliberately made the House represent people directly and equally, in contrast to the Senate, where each state got equal votes regardless of population -- the so-called Great Compromise.
- From this history the Court drew a governing rule: whenever a state divides itself into congressional districts, the Constitution requires that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election be worth as much as another's.
- Applying that rule to the facts, the Court found Georgia's Fifth District -- with more than twice the average district population and nearly three times the population of the smallest district -- failed this standard, so the 1931 apportionment law could not stand as written.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Colegrove v. Green (328 U.S. 549)
The Court held that Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion, backed by only a minority of Justices, did not bar judicial review of unequal congressional districts.
Reaffirms Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186)
The Court relied on Baker's holding that malapportionment claims are justiciable and extended that reasoning to congressional districts.