Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo
The Supreme Court put on hold a lower court order that had blocked immigration agents from stopping people in the Los Angeles area based solely on their apparent race, the language they speak, the places they gather, and the kind of work they do.
The emergency ruling lets the government's immigration enforcement operations resume while legal challenges continue, but it does not decide whether those tactics are constitutional — that question remains open in the lower courts.
How it got here: A California federal district court issued a temporary order on July 11, 2025 blocking the stops; the Ninth Circuit largely denied a stay pending appeal; the government then applied to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
During the summer of 2025, federal immigration officials launched "Operation At Large" across the Los Angeles area, deploying armed and masked agents to car washes, Home Depots, bus stops, farms, and day-labor sites. A district court found that agents were detaining people based solely on their apparent Latino ethnicity, speaking Spanish or accented English, working low-wage jobs, and being in certain locations — without asking any questions first or having individualized evidence of unlawful presence. U.S. citizens were among those grabbed, detained, and sometimes physically confronted before being released.
The question before the Court
Could the federal government pause a court order that barred immigration agents in the Los Angeles area from detaining people based solely on their apparent ethnicity, accent, location, and type of work?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court granted the stay, pausing the district court's order while the appeal proceeds. The unsigned order gives no reasoning, but Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence identified two grounds supporting the government's case. First, under the Court's 1983 Lyons decision, the named plaintiffs may lack the legal standing to seek a sweeping injunction because they cannot reliably show they face an imminent, recurring threat of unlawful stops. Second, existing case law permits immigration officers to make brief stops based on a "totality of the circumstances," and factors like apparent national origin, language, location, and type of work can each contribute to the required reasonable suspicion when weighed together.
The stay does not decide whether the government's tactics violated the Fourth Amendment. That underlying constitutional question remains open before the Ninth Circuit and, eventually, the district court, which was set to hold further hearings on a preliminary injunction and class certification.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Immigration agents in the greater Los Angeles area can again stop and detain people using the four factors the district court had blocked, including apparent Latino ethnicity and Spanish-language use. U.S. citizens and lawful residents who fit that profile remain exposed to stops and questioning. The case could ultimately reshape the rules governing immigration enforcement stops nationwide.
What changes now
With the stay in place, immigration agents in the greater Los Angeles area may resume the kinds of stops the district court had blocked while the Ninth Circuit hears the full appeal. The district court was scheduled to hold a hearing on September 24 on the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. A ruling on class certification could reshape the scope of any future injunction. If the Ninth Circuit ultimately rules against the government, the case could return to the Supreme Court for a full merits decision.
What this does not decide
This order does not decide whether the government's immigration stops violated the Fourth Amendment, whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek an injunction, or how broadly courts may enjoin enforcement practices. It only pauses one lower court's order temporarily. The constitutional questions are entirely unresolved and return to the lower courts.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
“Consistency and neutrality are hallmarks of good judging, and in my view, we abide by those enduring judicial values in this case by granting the stay.”Kavanaugh explaining why granting the stay, like past refusals to compel immigration enforcement, reflects consistent judicial restraint across administrations.
Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately to explain why he voted to grant the stay. He argued that the plaintiffs likely lack standing under Lyons because they cannot show an imminent, personal risk of being unlawfully stopped again. He also argued the Fourth Amendment's totality-of-circumstances test permits brief immigration stops based on multiple contextual factors — including location, type of work, and language — taken together, and that blocking such stops would require overruling or sharply narrowing two established lines of precedent. He also stressed that courts should not set immigration enforcement priorities, and that consistency across administrations requires equal restraint.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
“We should not have to live in a country where the Government can seize anyone who looks Latino, speaks Spanish, and appears to work a low wage job.”Sotomayor's core objection — that the Court's order exposes an entire ethnic community to suspicionless government seizure.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that the government failed to show the likelihood of success needed for a stay. She contended the four enumerated factors describe a vast, presumptively innocent population — nearly half of Los Angeles identifies as Latino — and that stopping people on that basis alone categorically fails the Fourth Amendment's individualized-suspicion requirement. She also argued the plaintiffs have strong standing given the documented, recurring pattern of raids at their workplaces. She further criticized the majority's unexplained order as another misuse of the emergency docket.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The legal test for an emergency stay requires the applicant to show: a fair prospect of winning on appeal (with certiorari likely if the court of appeals rules against it), a likelihood of irreparable harm without the stay, and a favorable balance of harms and public interest. The first two factors are the most critical under the Court's prior standard in Nken v. Holder.
- On likelihood of winning, Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence identified a standing problem with the plaintiffs' case. Under Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983), a plaintiff who was harmed in the past by a law enforcement practice cannot automatically sue for an injunction against future conduct — the plaintiff must show a real, imminent threat that the same harm will happen again. The concurrence found the named plaintiffs here, like the plaintiff in Lyons, had no strong basis to believe they personally faced an imminent, unlawful stop, and therefore likely lacked the legal standing to seek a broad, district-wide injunction.
- On the Fourth Amendment merits, immigration officers are permitted to briefly stop someone for questioning if they have 'reasonable suspicion' — a lower bar than probable cause — that the person is unlawfully present. Under Brignoni-Ponce (1975) and Arvizu (2002), courts assess reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, meaning many factors together can justify a stop even if no single factor would alone. Apparent national origin, though it cannot be the sole basis for a stop, can be a relevant factor alongside others.
- The concurrence reasoned that the unusually high concentration of undocumented immigrants in the Los Angeles area — estimated at roughly 10 percent of the population — combined with factors like the type of location and type of work, could together satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. Upholding the injunction, the concurrence argued, would require the Court to significantly narrow both the Lyons standing line of cases and the Brignoni-Ponce reasonable-suspicion line of cases, which the plaintiffs had not made a persuasive case to do.
- On irreparable harm, the concurrence reasoned that when a court order prevents the government from enforcing laws passed by Congress, that interference is itself a recognized form of irreparable injury. The district court's injunction also exposed immigration officers to contempt sanctions for stops later found to violate the order, which the concurrence said would inevitably chill legitimate enforcement activity.
- On balance of harms, the concurrence weighed the government's immigration enforcement interests — and the broader public's stake in the legal immigration system — against the limited harm to individuals who are lawfully present (who, the concurrence said, are quickly released after a brief stop). It found that balance tipped toward the government, and that maintaining judicial consistency and neutrality across administrations supported granting the stay.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Los Angeles v. Lyons (461 U.S. 95)
Plaintiffs need a concrete, imminent threat of recurring harm — not just past injury — to seek a forward-looking injunction against law enforcement.
Reaffirms United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (422 U.S. 873)
Immigration stops require reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances; apparent ethnicity can be one relevant factor among many.
Reaffirms Nken v. Holder (556 U.S. 418)
The two-part test for emergency stays — likely success on appeal and irreparable harm — remains the governing standard.