Riley v. Bondi Revisions: 6/26/25
The Supreme Court ruled that the 30-day clock to appeal a deportation order runs from when that original order was issued — not from when later, separate proceedings about whether the person can be sent to a specific country conclude.
The decision resolves a split among the federal appeals courts, but leaves deportees in a difficult position: they must file a protective court appeal within days of the initial deportation order, even though the outcome of their safety proceedings is unknown and those proceedings may take months or years.
“In sum, the statutory text and our precedents make clear that the FARO is the final order of removal in this case, and withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality of an otherwise final order of removal.”
The majority's core holding that the original deportation order — not the later torture-protection ruling — starts the 30-day appeal clock.
How it got here: After an immigration judge granted Riley torture-protection relief, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed; the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for review as jurisdictionally untimely; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two circuit splits and appointed amicus counsel to defend the dismissal because the government sided with Riley.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Pierre Riley, a Jamaican-born man who came to the U.S. at age 16, overstayed his visa, became involved in drug trafficking, and was convicted in 2008 of marijuana conspiracy and a firearms offense. Released early from a 25-year sentence in January 2021, he was immediately taken into immigration custody. Riley did not contest his deportation from the U.S. but argued he would likely be killed by a powerful Jamaican drug lord if sent back to Jamaica, seeking protection under an international anti-torture treaty.
The question before the Court
Must a person facing deportation file a court appeal within 30 days of the original deportation order, even if separate proceedings about whether they can be sent to a particular dangerous country are still ongoing?
The Court's answer
Yes — the 30-day clock runs from when the original deportation order was issued, not from when later proceedings about the specific destination country conclude. Under federal immigration law, a "final order of removal" must be one that concludes the person is deportable and orders deportation. Riley's January 2021 administrative order directing him to Jamaica met that definition; the May 2022 Board ruling on his torture-protection claim did not. Because expedited proceedings for people convicted of serious crimes allow no Board review of the original deportation order, that order became final immediately upon issuance — starting the 30-day clock at that moment.
The Court also held, however, that the 30-day deadline is not a rigid jurisdictional bar. Courts cannot enforce it on their own initiative, and parties can waive or forgo the argument. Because the government in this case chose not to argue that Riley's filing was too late, the Fourth Circuit was wrong to throw out his case as untimely. The case now goes back to the Fourth Circuit for further proceedings.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
People facing expedited deportation — typically those convicted of serious crimes — must now file a court appeal within 30 days of the original deportation order, even while separate torture-protection or other safety proceedings are still ongoing. Missing that narrow window risks losing any chance at judicial review of those safety claims, even if the safety proceedings are later decided against them.
What changes now
The case returns to the Fourth Circuit, which must first decide — as Justice Thomas's concurrence flagged — whether it has jurisdiction to hear a standalone challenge to the Board's torture-protection ruling when the petitioner never separately sought review of the underlying deportation order. If jurisdiction exists, the court will consider the merits of Riley's claim. Going forward, people in expedited deportation proceedings should file a protective court appeal within 30 days of the original deportation order to preserve their rights.
What this does not decide
The Court left open whether a federal appeals court has jurisdiction to review a torture-protection ruling when the petitioner never separately challenged the underlying deportation order — a distinct question Justice Thomas flagged for the Fourth Circuit to address on remand. The decision also does not reach the merits of whether Riley actually faces a risk of torture in Jamaica.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to flag a potential jurisdictional problem the Court did not resolve. Under a different statute, federal courts can review torture-protection (CAT) orders only 'as part of the review of a final order of removal.' Riley, however, never petitioned for review of the final deportation order — only of the Board's CAT ruling. Justice Thomas urged the Fourth Circuit to consider on remand whether it has any jurisdiction to review a CAT order when the petitioner did not seek review of the underlying deportation order.
Dissent in part — Justice Sotomayor
“The answer is clear: One should not be required to appeal an order before it exists.”Justice Sotomayor's pointed objection to a rule that required Riley to appeal the Board's order more than a year before it was issued.
Justice Sotomayor agreed the 30-day deadline is not jurisdictional (joining Part II-B) but disagreed sharply that the removal order became final in January 2021. The statutory definition of finality does not apply to expedited orders that cannot be appealed to the Board. Under centuries of appellate finality principles, orders that must be appealed together also become final together — and since Congress directed that CAT claims be consolidated with removal order appeals, the removal order should only become final once the Board resolves the CAT claim. The majority's rule absurdly requires deportees to appeal before the order they want to challenge even exists. Justice Gorsuch joined all but Part IV of this opinion.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first identified the 'final order of removal' that starts the 30-day appeal clock. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an 'order of removal' is one that concludes the person is deportable or orders deportation. Riley's January 2021 Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) satisfied that definition; the May 2022 Board of Immigration Appeals ruling denying his torture-protection claim did not, because that ruling didn't order deportation or conclude he was deportable — it only addressed where he could be sent.
- The Court then asked when the FARO became 'final.' The statute says a removal order becomes final at the earlier of a Board affirmance or the expiration of the period to seek Board review. In streamlined (expedited) proceedings — reserved for people convicted of serious crimes — there is no Board review of the FARO at all. The Court concluded that because no review period exists, it 'expires' the moment the order issues, making the FARO final immediately upon issuance.
- Two prior Supreme Court decisions reinforced this conclusion. In Nasrallah v. Barr (2020), the Court held that CAT orders do not 'disturb' or 'affect the validity' of a final removal order, so they do not merge into or restart the clock on that order. In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez (2021), the Court said 'the finality of the order of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.' Both cases taught that later proceedings about the destination country leave the earlier removal order's finality untouched.
- The Court next asked whether the 30-day deadline is 'jurisdictional' — meaning courts must dismiss a case for missing it even if neither party raises the issue. The Court has required a clear congressional signal before labeling any rule jurisdictional, because jurisdictional rules can derail otherwise orderly litigation. The text of §1252(b)(1) tells petitioners what they must do; it says nothing about what courts may do and does not mention jurisdiction. Its placement in the statute is also in a section unrelated to court authority.
- Tracing precedent back to Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (2006), which held courts must treat a rule as jurisdictional only if Congress 'clearly states' as much, the Court found that virtually every filing deadline it had examined since then failed that test. While Stone v. INS (1995) had loosely labeled the predecessor provision 'jurisdictional,' the Court explained that Stone used the term carelessly without distinguishing true jurisdictional rules from merely mandatory procedural ones — a distinction later cases drew sharply. No clear congressional signal appears here.
- Because the 30-day deadline is a procedural rule rather than a jurisdictional one, the government's choice not to press it as a reason to dismiss meant the Fourth Circuit had no basis to throw Riley's case out on that ground. The Court vacated the dismissal and sent the case back for further proceedings.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Nasrallah v. Barr (590 U.S. 573)
Confirmed that torture-protection orders are not final removal orders and do not disturb or merge into those orders.
Reaffirms Johnson v. Guzman Chavez (594 U.S. 523)
Confirmed that withholding-only proceedings do not affect the finality of an otherwise final removal order.
Limits Stone v. INS (514 U.S. 386)
Declined to treat Stone's loose 'jurisdictional' label on the predecessor filing deadline as a definitive interpretation worth preserving.
Reaffirms Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (546 U.S. 500)
Reaffirmed the rule that courts classify a deadline as jurisdictional only when Congress clearly says so.