NRC v. Texas
The Supreme Court ruled that Texas and a neighboring West Texas company could not challenge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's license for a private spent-nuclear-fuel storage facility, because neither had formally joined the agency's licensing proceeding as parties.
The ruling restores the facility's 40-year license for now, but the Court deliberately left open the bigger question of whether the NRC has legal authority to issue such licenses at all — a dispute that could resurface in a future case brought by a properly enrolled challenger.
How it got here: The NRC granted ISP a 40-year license; Texas and Fasken challenged it in the Fifth Circuit, which vacated the license; the NRC and ISP sought Supreme Court review, which was granted.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Interim Storage Partners applied for a federal license to build a private facility in Andrews County, West Texas, to store spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants across the country. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved a 40-year license in 2021. Texas and Fasken Land and Minerals — a ranching and oil-and-gas business with extensive land near the proposed site — submitted comments during the agency's review and objected to the project. Fasken also tried to formally join the licensing proceeding but was turned away by the agency under its intervention rules.
The question before the Court
Did Texas and a neighboring West Texas landowner have the legal right to challenge a federal agency's decision to license a private spent-nuclear-fuel storage facility in their state?
The Court's answer
No — Texas and Fasken had no legal right to challenge the NRC's licensing decision in court, because neither qualified as a "party aggrieved" under the Hobbs Act. Becoming a party to an NRC licensing proceeding requires either being the license applicant or being formally admitted as an intervenor. Texas never tried to intervene. Fasken tried, was denied, challenged that denial in the D.C. Circuit, lost, and chose not to appeal further. That outcome is final, and Fasken cannot use this new lawsuit to relitigate it. Submitting public comments during the environmental review is more like filing an amicus brief in court — it gives a voice, but does not create party status.
The Court also refused to let Texas and Fasken bypass the party-status requirement by labeling their challenge an "ultra vires" claim — arguing the NRC acted entirely outside its legal authority. That narrow doctrine applies only when an agency violates a specific statutory prohibition, not when a party merely disputes a debatable reading of a statute. The Court expressly left open whether the NRC actually has legal authority to license private off-site spent-fuel storage.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
States and private landowners who want to sue over a federal nuclear storage license must formally intervene in the NRC's licensing process first — submitting public comments during the environmental review is not enough. For now, the West Texas spent-fuel facility retains its license. The unresolved authority question means the NRC's power to license similar private off-site storage projects nationwide remains legally uncertain.
What changes now
The Fifth Circuit's ruling vacating ISP's license is reversed, and the case returns to the Fifth Circuit with instructions to dismiss the petitions for review. ISP's 40-year license to build the West Texas storage facility is restored. The Court expressly left open whether the NRC has statutory authority to issue such licenses — that question can be raised in the future by a party who has properly intervened in a Commission proceeding and then been denied or adversely affected.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly declined to decide whether the NRC has legal authority under the Atomic Energy Act or the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to license private, off-site storage of spent nuclear fuel. That question — which the dissent calls "not hard" and the Fifth Circuit ruled against the NRC — remains open for a future case brought by a proper party.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch dissented on two grounds. First, he argued the Nuclear Waste Policy Act plainly restricts interim spent-fuel storage to reactor sites or federally owned facilities, and the NRC's license to ISP was therefore unlawful. Second, he argued Texas and Fasken qualified as 'parties aggrieved' because they actively participated in the agency's mandatory environmental review, a required component of the overall licensing decision. He warned that accepting the majority's reasoning lets agencies control who can challenge their decisions in court — 'like letting the fox guard the henhouse.'
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Hobbs Act grants only a 'party aggrieved' — not just any affected person — the right to seek court review of a federal agency's final licensing order. Courts have consistently read 'party' to mean someone who participated as a formal party in the agency proceedings, not merely someone who was affected by the outcome.
- Under the Atomic Energy Act's § 2239, the only ways to become a party to an NRC licensing proceeding are: be the license applicant, or be formally admitted as an intervenor by the agency. Submitting comments on a draft environmental impact statement is more like filing an amicus brief in court — it gives a voice, but does not confer party status under this statutory scheme.
- Fasken tried to formally intervene in the NRC proceeding but was denied under the agency's internal rules. It challenged that denial in the D.C. Circuit and lost, then did not seek further review. That ruling is final; Fasken cannot use this new Hobbs Act lawsuit to relitigate the same intervention question before a different court. Texas, meanwhile, never even attempted to intervene.
- Texas and Fasken argued they could bypass the party-status requirement by labeling their challenge an 'ultra vires' claim — asserting the NRC acted entirely outside its legal authority. The Court has allowed such claims (under the narrow 'Leedom v. Kyne' exception from 1958) only when an agency violates a specific statutory prohibition — not when a party merely disputes a debatable statutory interpretation, which is all Texas and Fasken actually argued.
- The ultra vires path was also unavailable because entities seeking to intervene before the NRC already have an adequate route to judicial review: challenge the denial of intervention in court. When a statutory review scheme provides a meaningful opportunity to be heard, nonstatutory ultra vires review is foreclosed — and bringing such a claim originally in a court of appeals (rather than a district court) is unsupported by any precedent.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Leedom v. Kyne (358 U. S. 184)
The narrow exception allowing courts to hear challenges from non-parties does not apply to ordinary statutory-authority disputes.
Reaffirms Boire v. Greyhound Corp. (376 U. S. 473)
Reaffirmed that non-statutory ultra vires review is strictly limited and rarely available.