OCTOBER TERM, 2023 · DECIDED JUNE 13, 2024

602 U.S. 367 · No. 23-235 · Argued March 26, 2024

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FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
abortion pillFDA drug approvalwho can suemifepristoneabortion access

Opinion of the Court by Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson

The Supreme Court unanimously threw out a lawsuit seeking to restrict access to mifepristone, ruling that the pro-life doctors and medical groups who sued had no legal right to bring the case because they could not show a concrete, personal injury linked to the FDA's actions.

The decision leaves the FDA's current rules for mifepristone — which make the drug more widely available than earlier rules did — in place, but does not rule on whether those rules were lawful. It returns the case to the lower courts with instructions to dismiss it.

An Article III court is not a legislative assembly, a town square, or a faculty lounge.
Justice Kavanaugh

The majority explaining why federal courts are not a general forum for citizens to air objections to government policy.

How it got here: A federal district court in Texas effectively ordered mifepristone off the market; the Fifth Circuit affirmed that plaintiffs had standing and found the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions likely unlawful; the Supreme Court stayed the district court order and agreed to hear the case.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Four pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors sued the FDA, challenging the agency's 2016 and 2021 decisions that eased restrictions on mifepristone — an abortion drug. The relaxed rules extended the period of approved use, allowed nurse practitioners to prescribe the drug, cut the required in-person visits from three to one, and eventually dropped the in-person requirement entirely. The plaintiffs sought to force the FDA to reinstate the older, stricter conditions. None of the plaintiffs prescribe, manufacture, or use mifepristone themselves; their objections are moral, ideological, and legal.

The question before the Court

Could pro-life doctors and medical associations who do not prescribe or use mifepristone sue the FDA in federal court to force tighter restrictions on the abortion drug?

The Court's answer

No — the Court ruled unanimously that the pro-life doctors and medical associations had no legal right to bring this lawsuit in federal court. To sue, a person or organization must show a concrete, personal injury caused by the defendant's conduct. Because these plaintiffs neither prescribe nor use mifepristone, the FDA is not requiring them to do anything, and their core grievance is that other people are allowed to use a drug they oppose.

None of their specific injury theories held up either. Federal conscience laws already fully protect doctors from being forced to perform abortions against their will, cutting off any causal chain between the FDA's looser rules and a forced conscience violation. Claims that doctors would face more emergency patients — and thus higher costs and liability risks — were too speculative and attenuated to count, and no established legal doctrine lets healthcare providers challenge general public-safety rules simply because those rules might send more patients to their offices. The medical associations could not gain standing by voluntarily spending money to study and lobby against the FDA's actions.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Mifepristone stays available under the FDA's current, more permissive rules. Pro-life doctors and advocacy groups cannot use federal courts to tighten restrictions on the drug simply because they oppose its use on moral or policy grounds. Anyone seeking tighter federal rules on mifepristone must now work through Congress or the executive branch rather than the courts, unless a plaintiff with a more direct personal stake brings a new challenge.

What changes now

The case is sent back to the lower federal courts with instructions to dismiss it for lack of standing. Mifepristone remains available under the FDA's current 2016 and 2021 rules while the stay the Court previously issued is resolved. The merits question — whether the FDA's regulatory changes were lawful — was never decided and remains open if a plaintiff with a more direct personal stake, such as a competing drug manufacturer or a state with concrete regulatory interests, were to bring a new challenge.

What this does not decide

The Court did not rule on whether the FDA's 2016 or 2021 actions relaxing mifepristone restrictions were actually lawful under federal administrative law. It also did not decide that no one could ever challenge those actions — only that these particular plaintiffs could not. Future challengers with a more direct personal stake may still be able to sue.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately on two issues. First, he argued that the Court's third-party standing doctrine — which lets plaintiffs sue to vindicate someone else's rights — is itself constitutionally mistaken and should be reconsidered, because Article III traditionally required a plaintiff to assert only their own injuries. Second, and at greater length, he raised serious doubts about associational standing, the doctrine that allows groups to sue on behalf of their members without those members being parties. He argued the doctrine conflicts with Article III's injury and redressability requirements, undermines the class-action rules, and creates asymmetrical preclusion problems. He called on the Court to address these foundational questions in an appropriate future case.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court began with the Article III standing framework: to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) a concrete, personal injury in fact, (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant's conduct, and (3) that a court ruling could redress it. Standing is hardest to establish — and causation is hardest to prove — when, as here, the plaintiffs are not regulated by the challenged government action but are challenging how the government regulates someone else entirely.
  2. On the conscience-injury theory: the plaintiff doctors argued that looser mifepristone rules would cause more women to need emergency abortion-related care, and that some of those women would go to the plaintiff doctors, who might then be forced to treat them against their conscience. The Court accepted that a genuine conscience injury would be a real, concrete harm — but concluded that federal conscience laws (the Church Amendments) provide broad, definitive protection: a doctor may simply refuse to participate in any abortion-related treatment that violates their beliefs, and hospitals are legally required to accommodate that refusal. Because no doctor since mifepristone's approval in 2000 had been forced to violate their conscience despite those protections, the causal chain broke before it reached the plaintiffs.
  3. The Court also rejected the argument that EMTALA — the federal emergency-care law — might override those conscience protections and require individual emergency-room doctors to participate in emergency abortions. The Court agreed with the government that EMTALA imposes obligations on hospitals, not on individual doctors, and does not override a doctor's right to refuse on conscience grounds.
  4. On the economic-injury theory: the doctors claimed they would spend more time and money treating mifepristone complications, face higher liability exposure, and pay higher insurance premiums. The Court found these chains of causation too speculative — there was no evidence the 2016 and 2021 rule changes had actually increased the number of patients seeking the plaintiff doctors' care — and also too attenuated. The Court refused to create a new 'doctor standing' doctrine that would let any healthcare provider challenge any public-safety regulation on the theory that looser rules might send more injured people to their offices.
  5. On organizational standing: the medical associations argued they had standing because the FDA's actions forced them to spend money on studies, citizen petitions, and public advocacy. The Court held that an organization cannot manufacture standing by voluntarily spending resources to oppose a government action it dislikes. The earlier decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman — which recognized organizational standing when a defendant's conduct directly disrupted a housing counseling group's core service operations — did not extend so broadly, and the Court declined to stretch it here.
  6. Finally, the Court rejected the 'if not us, who?' argument — the suggestion that standing must exist here because otherwise no one could challenge the FDA's actions. The Court reaffirmed that some government actions may simply be left to the political branches, and that the absence of a willing plaintiff with proper standing is not itself a reason to grant standing to someone who lacks it.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Article III of the U.S. Constitution

Limits federal courts to actual 'Cases' and 'Controversies,' requiring anyone who sues to have a personal stake in the outcome.

Church Amendments (42 U.S.C. § 300a-7)

Federal law allowing doctors and other healthcare workers to refuse to perform abortions or other procedures that violate their conscience, without employer penalty.

Cases affected by this decision

Limits Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (455 U.S. 363)

Clarified that Havens recognized organizational standing only where a defendant directly disrupted the group's core service operations, not whenever an organization spends money opposing a disfavored policy.

Supreme Court Opinion

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FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | SCOTUS Reporter