Campos-Chaves v. Garland
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that three immigrants cannot undo their in absentia deportation orders by pointing to defective initial hearing notices, as long as the government later sent valid follow-up notices specifying the time and place of the hearings they skipped.
The decision resolves a split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and effectively shields a large number of existing in absentia removal orders from challenge, even though the government acknowledged it had routinely issued initial notices that lacked required date-and-time information.
“But § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) does not allow aliens to seek rescission of removal orders in perpetuity based on arguments they could have raised in a hearing that they chose to skip.”
The majority's bottom-line rationale for barring rescission when the immigrant skipped a hearing despite receiving valid notice of it.
How it got here: The Fifth Circuit denied one immigrant's petition to reopen removal proceedings; the Ninth Circuit granted two similar petitions in companion cases; the Supreme Court agreed to hear all three cases together.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Three immigrants — from El Salvador, India, and Mexico — each received an initial government "notice to appear" for removal proceedings that listed the hearing time only as "TBD" or "to be set." The government later sent each a follow-up notice with a specific date and time. All three missed their hearings and were ordered removed in their absence. Each then sought to undo that removal order, arguing the legally defective initial notice entitled them to rescission.
The question before the Court
Can an immigrant undo a deportation order entered while he was absent from his hearing, simply by pointing to a technically defective initial notice, if the government later sent a valid notice telling him exactly when and where the hearing would be?
The Court's answer
No — an immigrant cannot undo an in absentia removal order simply because the government failed to send a fully compliant initial "notice to appear" (NTA), as long as the government later sent a proper hearing notice specifying the exact time and place of the proceeding the immigrant missed. The Court read the statute's reference to notice under "paragraph (1) or (2)" as disjunctive — meaning either type of notice, standing alone, satisfies the law for the specific hearing at issue. It also held that the legally relevant notice is the one tied to the particular hearing the immigrant skipped, not any notice issued at any point in the case.
All three immigrants here received follow-up hearing notices specifying the exact date and time of the hearings they failed to attend. The Court ruled those notices qualified as valid paragraph (2) notices because they conveyed "new" specific times — the first actual hearing dates any of the immigrants had received — regardless of the fact that the original NTAs had listed the hearing time only as "to be set." Having received valid notice for the hearings they missed, the immigrants cannot seek to reopen their removal proceedings on defective-notice grounds.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Immigrants ordered removed in absentia after receiving defective initial notices — but who later got follow-up hearing notices with specific dates and times — will have great difficulty reopening those removal proceedings. Immigration advocates lose a significant legal tool, and the government faces reduced pressure to fix its long-standing practice of issuing incomplete initial notices.
What changes now
The Fifth Circuit's ruling against the El Salvador-born immigrant stands. The Ninth Circuit's rulings favoring the other two immigrants are undone: the Mexico-born immigrant's case is reversed outright, and the India-born immigrant's case is sent back to the Ninth Circuit to address a separate argument it had not yet reached. More broadly, the ruling means immigrants with similar defective-NTA situations nationwide face a high bar in seeking to reopen in absentia removal orders.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not free the government from its obligation to issue complete, time-and-place-specific initial NTAs. It also does not resolve what remedies exist when an NTA omits other required information — such as the charges against an immigrant or the right to counsel — and does not address whether rescission in such cases is automatic or discretionary.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson argued the majority misread the statute by treating a paragraph (2) follow-up hearing notice as a standalone alternative to the mandatory paragraph (1) NTA. In her view, a paragraph (2) notice is like a construction change order — it only makes sense in relation to a complete, prior NTA, because there can be no 'change' in time without a previously set time. Because none of the immigrants received a legally compliant NTA, their follow-up notices could not qualify as valid paragraph (2) notices either. She also warned the ruling removes any incentive for the government to stop its years-long practice of issuing defective NTAs, effectively shifting onto immigrants the burden of correcting the government's own statutory violations.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the text of the rescission provision (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)), which lets an immigrant undo an in absentia removal order if he can show he 'did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)' of the notice statute. The word 'or' is almost always disjunctive — meaning either option satisfies the condition — and the Court found nothing in the statutory context to override that default reading.
- The Court reinforced this by looking at the nearby provision that authorizes in absentia removal in the first place (§ 1229a(b)(5)(A)), which also uses 'paragraph (1) or (2)' notice language. That provision unambiguously requires only one form of notice before someone can be ordered removed in absentia. Requiring two forms of notice to defend the order — while only one is needed to obtain it — would create a nonsensical imbalance Congress almost certainly did not intend.
- The Court then resolved which specific notice matters: not any notice ever sent, but the one informing the immigrant of the particular hearing at which he was ordered removed. A paragraph (2) follow-up notice supersedes the original NTA by setting a new hearing time, and it is that notice — tied to the singular missed proceeding — that the government must prove it provided, and that the immigrant must prove he never received.
- The immigrants argued that a paragraph (2) notice requires a 'change' from a previously set time, so it cannot apply when no specific time was ever set. The Court rejected this reading. 'Change' can mean replacing a placeholder ('TBD') with a concrete date — not only swapping one specific date for another. The Court also rejected the argument that 'new' time implies an 'old' time: 'new' simply describes something that originated lately, just as a 'new baby' does not imply replacing an old one.
- Applying these principles, all three immigrants had received paragraph (2) notices that provided specific dates and times for the hearings they missed. Those notices met every statutory requirement: they gave a 'new' time (the first actual hearing time any of them ever received) and warned of the consequences of failing to appear. The immigrants therefore received adequate notice and are barred from seeking rescission of their removal orders on defective-notice grounds.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Pereira v. Sessions (585 U. S. 198)
The majority called Pereira's statement that paragraph (2) presupposes a compliant NTA mere dicta about the narrow stop-time rule, not a holding controlling today's question.
Distinguishes Niz-Chavez v. Garland (593 U. S. 155)
The majority said Niz-Chavez confirmed paragraph (2) can supplement a compliant NTA but did not foreclose paragraph (2) notices from issuing in other circumstances.