United States v. Rahimi
Headline: Domestic violence orders can trigger temporary disarming: Court upholds federal ban’s application when a judge finds a credible threat, allowing prosecutions while qualifying restraining orders remain in effect.
Holding: When a court finds someone poses a credible threat under a qualifying domestic violence restraining order, that person may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.
- Allows temporary disarmament after a court finds a credible threat.
- Enables prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) when order criteria are met.
- Focuses federal enforcement on people subject to qualifying restraining orders.
Summary
Background
A man named Zackey Rahimi was subject to a state domestic violence restraining order that found he posed a “credible threat” to his partner and her child and suspended his gun license for two years. Police later found frearms at his home after other alleged violent incidents. Rahimi was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) for possessing a frearm while subject to such an order. He moved to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds; the District Court denied the motion, and the Fifth Circuit, after this Court's decision in Bruen, reversed, concluding the Government had not shown a historical analogue. The Supreme Court granted review.
Reasoning
The Court applied Bruen's historical-analogue test and asked whether the restriction fts within the Nation's tradition of frearm regulation. It traced founding-era surety laws and “going armed” laws that disarmed or constrained people who threatened others and concluded those traditions allow temporary disarmament when a court fnds a credible threat. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) was similar enough in both why and how it burdens the right because it follows a judicial fnding, is time-limited while an order is in effect, and imposes a lesser restraint than imprisonment. The Court held Rahimi's facial challenge failed because the statute is constitutional as applied to him.
Real world impact
The ruling permits temporary federal disarmament of people whom courts have found to present credible threats under qualifying protective orders. It allows prosecutions under §922(g)(8) when statutory criteria are met and leaves broader questions—other applications and permanent disarmament—open for future cases.
Dissents or concurrances
Multiple Justices fled separate concurrences; Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred. Justice Thomas dissented, arguing historical analogues were insuffcient.
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