City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 that cities may enforce public-camping ordinances against homeless people without violating the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, reversing a Ninth Circuit rule that had restricted such enforcement for five years across the American West.
The decision returns homelessness policy to elected local officials, ending a federal judicial framework that many Western cities said had paralyzed their efforts to clear encampments and connect homeless residents with services.
How it got here: Two homeless residents filed a class action; a federal district court certified the class and blocked enforcement; a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed; Grants Pass petitioned the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Grants Pass, Oregon (population ~38,000) had ordinances prohibiting camping and overnight parking on public property, with penalties escalating from civil fines to a maximum of 30 days in jail. Two homeless residents who slept in their cars sued on behalf of all homeless people in the city, arguing the ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment because the city's homeless population far outnumbered available shelter beds.
The question before the Court
Can cities enforce public-camping laws against homeless people, or does the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment protect those with nowhere else to sleep?
The Court's answer
No — the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not bar cities from enforcing public-camping ordinances. That provision has always governed the kind of punishment a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not what conduct it may criminalize in the first place. The punishments Grants Pass uses — civil fines, temporary park bans, and up to 30 days in jail for the most serious violators — are neither cruel nor unusual by any historical measure.
The plaintiffs relied on Robinson v. California (1962), which held the Eighth Amendment bars criminalizing the "status" of drug addiction. But Grants Pass's ordinances prohibit specific actions — setting up a campsite, sleeping with bedding on public property — that apply equally to tourists, protesters, and anyone else, regardless of housing status. Because these laws target conduct rather than status, Robinson does not apply. The Court also declined to extend Robinson to cover "involuntary" acts, following Powell v. Texas (1968), which drew the same line and left contested questions about homelessness policy to elected officials rather than federal judges.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Homeless people across the country can now be fined and, for repeat violations, jailed under public-camping laws regardless of whether shelter beds are available. Cities — especially in Western states — can enforce encampment-clearing policies more freely. People experiencing homelessness retain other potential legal challenges under state law, the Excessive Fines Clause, and the Due Process Clause.
What changes now
The case goes back to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings under the Court's ruling. Cities across the country — especially in the West — may now enforce public-camping ordinances without being constrained by the shelter-availability rule established in Martin v. Boise. Homeless residents and advocates can still challenge these ordinances on other grounds, including Oregon's newer state camping-regulation law, the Excessive Fines Clause, and the Due Process Clause.
What this does not decide
The ruling covers only the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. It does not decide whether the fines violate the Excessive Fines Clause, whether Due Process limits enforcement, whether Oregon's newer state camping law supersedes these ordinances, or whether equal-protection and selective-prosecution principles place independent limits on enforcement against homeless people.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to make two additional points. First, he argued Robinson v. California was wrongly decided from the start — its holding rested on public opinion rather than the Eighth Amendment's text and original meaning, and the Court should overrule it in an appropriate future case. Second, he questioned whether the plaintiffs even established that their claims fall under the Eighth Amendment at all, since the ordinances are primarily enforced through civil fines and park-exclusion orders rather than criminal penalties.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor argued that the Grants Pass ordinances effectively criminalize the status of being homeless — for someone with no available shelter, the only way to comply is to leave the city entirely. She would have upheld the Ninth Circuit's narrow Martin rule as a constitutional minimum: cities cannot punish homeless people with no access to shelter for the biological necessity of sleeping in public. She accused the majority of abandoning the Court's duty to protect the most vulnerable, leaving them an impossible choice between staying awake and being arrested.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause focuses on the kind of punishment a government may impose after a criminal conviction — not on what behaviors governments may criminalize in the first place. Other constitutional provisions (the First Amendment, Due Process Clauses, Equal Protection) speak to what may be criminalized; the Eighth Amendment addresses what happens after conviction, making it a poor fit for the kind of injunction the plaintiffs sought.
- The specific punishments Grants Pass imposes are not 'cruel' (none is designed to add 'terror, pain, or disgrace') and not 'unusual' (civil fines, temporary exclusion orders, and short jail terms are standard tools of criminal punishment used throughout the country). Neither the plaintiffs nor the dissent meaningfully disputed this.
- The plaintiffs relied on Robinson v. California (1962), where the Court held the Eighth Amendment bars criminalizing someone's 'status' — specifically, the status of being addicted to narcotics. But Robinson itself stressed that states retain broad power to criminalize knowing drug use even by addicts; its holding is narrow: a state may not make the mere fact of who someone is into a crime.
- Grants Pass's ordinances prohibit specific actions — setting up a campsite or sleeping with bedding on public property — that apply equally to backpackers, protesters, and anyone else, regardless of housing status. Because the laws target conduct rather than status, Robinson is not implicated, even if the laws in practice fall most heavily on homeless residents.
- The plaintiffs argued the Court should extend Robinson to cover 'involuntary' acts: actions that homeless people with no shelter cannot avoid. The Court had already rejected that argument in Powell v. Texas (1968), where a chronic alcoholic convicted of being drunk in public made the same claim. Powell held that Robinson covers only laws criminalizing 'mere status' — not laws that prohibit acts, even acts a defendant claims are involuntary because of a condition or circumstance.
- Extending Robinson to 'involuntary' conduct would force courts to answer — without any guidance from the Eighth Amendment's text or history — contested policy questions like what makes homelessness 'involuntary' and what shelter counts as 'available.' The Ninth Circuit's experience with those questions under Martin v. Boise showed they are unworkable in practice and intrude on the democratic process that is better suited to resolving them.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Robinson v. California (370 U.S. 660)
Robinson bars only laws that criminalize a person's status; it does not apply to laws that prohibit specific conduct like public camping.
Reaffirms Powell v. Texas (392 U.S. 514)
Powell's holding that Robinson covers only 'mere status' crimes — not involuntary conduct — is confirmed and applied to the homelessness context.