United States v. Shirey

1959-04-20
Share:

Headline: Decision reverses dismissal and holds that offering money to a congressman (even if paid to his political party) to secure a federal post violates the federal ban on buying public office.

Holding:

Real World Impact:
  • Treats payments to a political party for influence as prosecutable under federal law.
  • Prevents avoiding bribery rules by routing offers through party treasuries.
  • Reverses dismissal so such offers can be charged and tried in federal court.
Topics: political corruption, buying public office, campaign contributions, bribery law

Summary

Background

A man seeking the postmaster job in York, Pennsylvania was accused of offering to give $1,000 a year to the Republican Party if a member of Congress would use his influence to obtain the appointment. The District Court dismissed the criminal information for failing to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 214. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court to decide whether the statute covers this kind of offer.

Reasoning

The Court examined the statute’s words and its legislative history. It explained two reasonable readings: the offer could be seen as a promise to the congressman to use his influence, or as a promise to give money to the party in return for the congressman’s influence. The Court found both readings cover the triangle where money is paid to a party. The history of the law — aimed at punishing purchase and sale of public offices and payments to party treasuries — supported including party payments within the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding the allegations fall within § 214.

Real world impact

The ruling treats offers to pay political parties to secure appointive federal offices as criminal under the anti-purchase-of-offices statute. It prevents people from avoiding the law by routing payments through party coffers, and allows prosecutors to charge similar conduct under § 214.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Douglas agreed the statute is broad enough. Justice Harlan (joined by three others) dissented, arguing the statute is ambiguous, that its history points the other way, and that he would have affirmed the dismissal.

Ask about this case

Ask questions about the entire case, including all opinions (majority, concurrences, dissents).

What was the Court's main decision and reasoning?

How did the dissenting opinions differ from the majority?

What are the practical implications of this ruling?

Related Cases