A.A.R.P. v. Trump
The Supreme Court temporarily blocked the government from deporting Venezuelan detainees held under the Alien Enemies Act, ruling that roughly 24 hours' notice with no guidance on how to contest removal almost certainly falls short of what the Constitution requires.
The decision sends the case back to a lower court to determine exactly how much advance notice is required, while leaving untouched the bigger question of whether the Alien Enemies Act even lawfully permits these deportations.
How it got here: A Texas district court denied emergency relief; the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as premature; detainees then applied directly to the Supreme Court for an injunction blocking their removal.
The Case in Depth
What happened
The Trump administration invoked the Alien Enemies Act — a rarely used wartime law — to rapidly deport Venezuelan nationals it identified as members of Tren de Aragua, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees and a large group of similarly held individuals in Texas said they received removal notices with no meaningful information about how to challenge the deportations, and that officials were planning to put them on flights within hours of serving those notices.
The question before the Court
Can the government deport Venezuelan detainees held under a wartime law with only about 24 hours' notice and no explanation of how to legally challenge the removal?
The Court's answer
No — at least not on the notice provided here. The Court held that roughly 24 hours' notice that contains no information about how to exercise the legal right to challenge removal almost certainly fails the constitutional minimum. The Constitution's guarantee of fair process requires notice that gives a person a real opportunity to contact a lawyer, file a legal challenge, and pursue relief before being expelled from the country — and notice with no guidance on how to do any of those things does not meet that bar.
The Court stopped short of setting a precise minimum, sending the case back to a lower court to work that out. In the meantime, it blocked the government from removing any of the affected detainees under the Alien Enemies Act while that question is being resolved. The Court explicitly did not rule on the broader question of whether the Alien Enemies Act actually authorizes these deportations in the first place.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Hundreds of Venezuelan detainees accused of gang membership cannot be deported under the Alien Enemies Act until courts decide what constitutional notice they are entitled to. The ruling preserves judicial oversight over a fast-moving deportation program and signals that courts — not just the executive branch — will have a say in when and how such removals can proceed.
What changes now
The Fifth Circuit must now decide two things: first, whether the Alien Enemies Act actually authorizes removal of these detainees under the President's March 2025 proclamation; and second, exactly how much advance notice the Constitution requires before removal can proceed. The injunction blocking removal stays in effect until the Fifth Circuit rules and, if the Supreme Court later agrees to hear the merits, until final judgment. If the Court declines to take the case after the Fifth Circuit rules, the injunction ends automatically. The government may still remove these individuals under other immigration laws.
What this does not decide
The Court explicitly did not decide whether the Alien Enemies Act lawfully authorizes the removal of these detainees under the President's March 2025 proclamation — that question goes back to the Fifth Circuit. The Court also did not set a specific minimum notice period, only that 24 hours with no information about legal rights is insufficient.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the Court's decision to grant the temporary injunction, which he said simply ensures courts can rule on the legality of the removals before they happen. But he would have gone further: rather than sending the case back to the Fifth Circuit, he would have granted full certiorari right away, ordered expedited briefing, scheduled oral argument promptly, and resolved the core legal questions now. He noted that both the government and the detainees agree on the urgency of a final answer.
Dissent — Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, raised three objections. First, he argued the Court had no jurisdiction at all, because the district court never actually — or constructively — refused to grant an injunction; rather, it was working diligently on a difficult question and had given the government only a short window to respond. Second, he argued the detainees failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits required for emergency injunctive relief, particularly on the question of whether class-action procedures can even be used in habeas proceedings. Third, he said granting certiorari before either lower court had ruled on the merits was a sharp and unwarranted departure from the Court's normal role as a court of review, not a court of first decision.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first addressed whether it had authority to step in at all. The Fifth Circuit had dismissed the detainees' appeal, saying they gave the district court only 42 minutes to act. The Court disagreed, applying the established rule from Carson v. American Brands (1981) that appeals courts have jurisdiction to review situations where a lower court's inaction effectively functions as a refusal to grant an injunction — particularly when the stakes are severe and irreparable harm is imminent.
- Applying that rule to the facts, the Court found that the district court's failure to act for 14 hours and 28 minutes — while detainees faced what appeared to be same-day or next-day removal — had the practical effect of refusing emergency protection. The Court also noted the government had reserved the right to begin removals after midnight, and evidence later showed it had already begun transporting detainees toward an airport.
- The Court then turned to due process — the constitutional requirement of fair procedure before the government deprives someone of liberty. It anchored on an earlier unanimous ruling in Trump v. J.G.G. (2025) that Alien Enemies Act detainees must receive notice 'within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief' — meaning the legal process of challenging imprisonment — before any removal occurs.
- To 'actually seek' that relief, a detainee must have enough time and enough information to contact a lawyer, file a petition, and pursue appropriate remedies. The government did not contest the detainees' account of the notice given, and the Court found that notice of roughly 24 hours with no explanation of how to assert legal rights 'surely does not pass muster' under this standard.
- Rather than fix the precise notice requirement itself, the Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit, reasoning that a lower court closer to the facts on the ground is better positioned to calibrate exactly what the Constitution demands in this context. The injunction was kept in place to preserve court oversight while that question is resolved.
- The Court also addressed why it could protect the entire group of detainees, not just the two named individuals. It held that courts may issue temporary protection to a putative class — a group of similarly situated people who have not yet been formally certified as a class — to preserve jurisdiction while the underlying rights question is worked out, and that the government cannot defeat group treatment simply by promising not to deport the named individuals.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Trump v. J. G. G. (604 U.S. ___)
All nine justices' prior agreement that AEA detainees must receive meaningful notice before removal is restated as the governing rule.
Reaffirms Carson v. American Brands, Inc. (450 U.S. 79)
The rule allowing appeals courts to review orders with the practical effect of refusing an injunction is applied to the district court's inaction here.