OCTOBER TERM 1957 · DECIDED MAY 19, 1958 · 9–0

356 U.S. 369 · No. 87 · Argued January 16, 1958

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Sherman v. United States

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
entrapment defensenarcotics prosecutionpolice informantscriminal procedure

Opinion of the Court by Justice Warren

The Supreme Court threw out a man's narcotics conviction, ruling that the evidence showed as a matter of law that a government informer had talked him into committing the crime rather than merely catching someone already willing to do it.

The decision reaffirms that when the government itself creates the crime by preying on a person's weaknesses, courts must dismiss the case rather than let a jury decide, protecting people from being manufactured into criminals by undercover operations.

The Government cannot disown Kalchinian and insist it is not responsible for his actions.
Justice Warren

Rejecting the government's attempt to distance itself from its informer's conduct.

How it got here: A first conviction was reversed for faulty jury instructions on entrapment; after a second trial and conviction, the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

The Case in Depth

What happened

A man being treated for narcotics addiction met a government informer, Kalchinian, at the doctor's office where both got treatment. The informer, also addicted, repeatedly begged the man to get him narcotics, eventually wearing down his resistance. After several drug transfers between the two, the informer tipped off federal narcotics agents, who then set up and witnessed additional sales, leading to the man's prosecution and conviction.

The question before the Court

Did a government informer cross the line into illegal entrapment by repeatedly pressuring a recovering addict, playing on sympathy, until he agreed to get him narcotics?

Why it matters

The ruling limits how far government informers and undercover agents can go in pressuring reluctant people into crimes, especially vulnerable people like recovering addicts. It reassures the public that courts will step in and dismiss a case outright when the record clearly shows the government, not the defendant, created the crime.

What changes now

The case is sent back to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the indictment entirely, meaning the defendant cannot be retried on these charges. The decision does not change the basic entrapment framework from Sorrells, though four justices urged the Court to adopt a different, police-conduct-focused test in future cases, leaving that question open for later litigation.

What this does not decide

The Court did not adopt the alternative "objective" entrapment test—focused solely on police conduct and decided by judges rather than juries—that four justices favored in a separate opinion. That broader question about how entrapment should be analyzed going forward remains unresolved and was left for a future case with full argument from both sides.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Frankfurter

Frankfurter agreed the conviction should be reversed but rejected the majority's focus on whether the defendant was personally predisposed to commit the crime. He argued courts should instead ask objectively whether police conduct was likely to ensnare law-abiding people generally, regardless of a defendant's criminal record, and that judges—not juries—should decide this question to build consistent standards for policing entrapment over time.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied the entrapment defense recognized in Sorrells v. United States, which asks whether the government merely gave a person the opportunity to commit a crime, or instead planted the criminal idea in an otherwise innocent person's mind and talked him into it.
  2. Under that framework, the government may point to evidence that the defendant was already predisposed to commit the crime, but if the record shows the crime was truly the product of government inducement, entrapment is established regardless of how the government characterizes the defendant's hesitation.
  3. Reviewing the informer's own undisputed testimony, the Court found he approached the defendant knowing he was trying to quit narcotics, made repeated requests despite initial refusals, and used sympathy about his own suffering to overcome the defendant's resistance.
  4. The Court found the government's evidence of predisposition weak: no narcotics were found on the defendant, there was no proof he profited from the sales, and his two old convictions (nine and five years earlier) were too stale to show he was ready to sell drugs at the time he was approached.
  5. Because the undisputed facts showed the crime was the product of the informer's persistent inducement rather than the defendant's own readiness, the Court concluded entrapment was established as a matter of law, meaning no reasonable jury could have found otherwise.
  6. The Court declined to adopt an alternative test proposed in a separate opinion from an earlier case, which would have had judges rather than juries decide entrapment based solely on police conduct, because that issue was not raised by the parties and would require overruling existing precedent without the benefit of argument.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

21 U.S.C. § 174

Federal law making it a crime to sell certain narcotics without authorization.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Sorrells v. United States (287 U.S. 435)

The Court relies on Sorrells' entrapment framework and declines to replace it with an alternative test.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Sherman v. United States | SCOTUS Reporter