Barber v. Gonzales

1954-06-07

Headline: Ruling blocks deportation of Filipino-born U.S. national, holding his 1930 move to the mainland was not the law's meaning of 'entry', so he cannot be deported under the 1917 law.

Holding: The Court held that a man's 1930 move from the Philippine Islands to the U.S. mainland did not count as an 'entry' under §19(a), so he is not deportable under that provision.

Real World Impact:

Prevents deportation under §19(a) when no technical 'entry' from a foreign place occurred.
Limits government power to deport people who came from U.S. territories while nationals.
Leaves questions about the 1934 Philippine law and congressional power undecided.

Topics: deportation, immigration rules, Philippine nationals, meaning of entry

Summary

Background

The case involves a man born in the Philippine Islands in 1913 who moved to the U.S. mainland in 1930 and lived here since. He was convicted in 1941 of assault with a deadly weapon and in 1950 of second-degree burglary. After an administrative hearing in 1951, immigration officials ordered him deported under §19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who had been sentenced more than once for crimes involving moral turpitude. He challenged the deportation, arguing he never made an 'entry' to the United States within the meaning of that statute.

Reasoning

The Court’s central question was whether his 1930 move from the Philippine Islands to the mainland counted as an 'entry' that would make him deportable. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that 'entry' in §19(a) has a technical meaning requiring arrival from a foreign port or place. Because he came from a U.S. insular possession while he was a United States national, the Court concluded he had made no such entry and therefore was not deportable under §19(a). The Court emphasized that deportation statutes may have severe consequences and should be strictly construed.

Real world impact

The decision prevents this man’s deportation under the cited statute and limits deportation where individuals entered from U.S. territories while nationals. It leaves open other legal questions about the 1934 Philippine Independence Act and about Congress’s power, which the Court did not decide. The ruling affects how officials apply the word 'entry' in similar cases until Congress or later cases change the rule.

Dissents or concurrances

A dissenting opinion argued the Court should use the ordinary meaning of 'entry' — any coming into the United States from outside — which would have supported deportation and criticized the narrow construction favoring the convicted man.