Morissette v. United States
The Court threw out the conviction of a Michigan junk dealer who collected old bomb casings he believed had been abandoned on a military bombing range, ruling that federal theft and conversion laws still require proof of a guilty state of mind even though the statute doesn't say so explicitly.
The decision rejects the idea that any federal crime lacking the word 'intent' automatically becomes a crime of strict liability, preserving the centuries-old rule that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal for offenses rooted in the common law, like theft.
“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.”
The Court explains why criminal intent has long been treated as essential to guilt.
How it got here: A federal trial judge refused to let the jury consider innocent intent and instructed that intent was presumed from the taking; he was convicted, the Sixth Circuit affirmed over a dissent, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A traveling scrap collector and fruit-stand operator hunted on a rural Michigan bombing range and, finding no deer, gathered three tons of old, rusting spent bomb casings that had been dumped in piles for years and sold them as scrap for $84. He was indicted for willfully and knowingly stealing and converting government property, though he told investigators from the start that he believed the casings were abandoned junk.
The question before the Court
Could a scrap collector be convicted of stealing government property just because he took it, without the jury ever considering whether he honestly believed it was abandoned?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that intent still matters, even though the statute's text doesn't use that word. Theft-type crimes like stealing and knowing conversion of government property come from the common law's ancient tradition, which has always required a guilty mind alongside a guilty act. Congress's silence about intent when it wrote this law should be read as accepting that background rule, not erasing it, since state courts have consistently required intent for theft-type offenses even without express statutory language.
Because intent was a real element of the charge, it was a factual question for the jury, not something a judge could presume simply because the defendant admitted taking the property. The trial judge's instruction that intent was "presumed" from the act of taking improperly took that question away from the jury, so the conviction could not stand.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Anyone charged under federal theft or conversion laws is now guaranteed a jury's fair chance to consider innocent explanations, rather than having a judge instruct that intent is presumed from the act of taking. The ruling also limits how far prosecutors and courts can stretch 'strict liability' reasoning from regulatory law into traditional crimes like theft.
What changes now
The case is reversed and will need to be retried, with the jury properly allowed to weigh the collector's testimony that he believed the bomb casings were abandoned, along with all the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether he had the guilty knowledge required for theft or knowing conversion. The ruling is final as to the legal standard but leaves the ultimate question of guilt to a new jury.
What this does not decide
The Court did not rule that all federal crimes require proof of intent — it left undisturbed the earlier decisions allowing conviction without intent for regulatory 'public welfare offenses' like narcotics-sale violations, confining its holding to crimes, like theft, that were historically defined by the common law.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Douglas
Justice Douglas agreed only with the result — reversing the conviction — without joining the Court's reasoning. The opinion gives no further explanation of his separate view.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court examined whether Congress's silence about intent in the federal theft and conversion statute meant intent was not required, tracing two prior decisions that had allowed convictions without proof of intent for offenses like selling narcotics.
- The Court explained that those earlier cases involved a distinct category of 'public welfare offenses' — new regulatory duties (like food purity or traffic rules) created to protect the public, where lawmakers deliberately dispensed with intent because the offenses are minor, carry light penalties, and don't carry the stigma of traditional crime.
- Because theft, larceny, and similar takings are ancient common-law crimes carrying serious punishment and moral condemnation, and because state courts have uniformly required proof of intent for such crimes even when a statute is silent, the Court held that Congress's silence here should be read to preserve, not eliminate, the intent requirement.
- The Court concluded that 'knowing conversion,' the specific charge used against the collector, required proof that he knew facts making his taking wrongful — meaning he could not be guilty if he genuinely believed the casings were abandoned property with no owner.
- Because intent was a genuine element of the crime, the Court held it was a factual question that had to go to the jury, not a legal conclusion a judge could presume from the mere fact that the defendant took the property.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits United States v. Balint (258 U. S. 250)
Confined to regulatory 'public welfare' offenses, not extended to traditional crimes like theft.
Limits United States v. Behrman (258 U. S. 280)
Restricted to its narcotics-regulation context rather than treated as eliminating intent generally.
Reaffirms United States v. Dotterweich (320 U. S. 277)
Cited as still-good law explaining why some regulatory penalties can dispense with awareness of wrongdoing.