In Re Summers

1945-06-11

Headline: Religious non-violence rejected: Court upheld Illinois’ denial of bar admission to a conscientious objector, allowing states to bar applicants unwilling to pledge willingness to serve in the militia.

Holding: The Court upheld Illinois’ refusal to admit a man to the bar because his sincere conscientious objection made him unable in good faith to take the state oath requiring willingness to perform militia service.

Real World Impact:

Allows states to deny bar admission for unwillingness to perform militia service.
Permits character committees to consider refusal to take the state oath.
Makes it harder for conscientious objectors to obtain certain professional licenses.

Topics: religious freedom, bar admission, conscientious objectors, military service

Summary

Background

Clyde Wilson Summers applied for admission to the Illinois bar and met every formal requirement except a certificate from the Committee on Character and Fitness. The Committee refused to certify him because he is a conscientious objector who refuses all use of force and would not, in good faith, pledge willingness to serve in the State militia. The Illinois Supreme Court sustained the Committee’s report in informal letters and denied reconsideration, and Summers asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review that denial as violating the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment’s protection for religious belief.

Reasoning

The U.S. Supreme Court first held that the matter presented a real controversy fit for review even though Illinois treated admission as a nonjudicial or ministerial act. The Court then accepted Illinois’ position that the state requires applicants to take an oath to support the State Constitution and that, as Illinois interpreted that oath, a willingness to perform militia service is a necessary element. Because Summers would not in good faith take an oath that implied willingness to perform militia service, the Court concluded the State lawfully could refuse admission. The Court stressed there was no showing of hostile religious discrimination in the record.

Real world impact

The decision allows states to consider an applicant’s unwillingness to perform militia service when judging fitness for the bar and similar public roles. It leaves in place Illinois’ practice of denying admission where an applicant’s sincerely held beliefs make taking the state oath in good faith impossible. The ruling relied on comparisons to earlier cases about military obligations and naturalization.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Black dissented, arguing the State unlawfully punished Summers’ religious beliefs, would bar conscientious objectors and some religious groups from professions, and should have reversed the Illinois decision.