Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi
The Supreme Court ruled that when an immigrant's deadline to leave the U.S. voluntarily falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it automatically extends to the next business day — the same rolling-over rule that applies to other deadlines in immigration law.
The decision resolves a split between federal appeals courts and protects immigrants from losing years of eligibility for immigration relief simply because their court-set deadline happened to land on a non-business day.
How it got here: The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled Monsalvo's motion to reopen was one day late; the Tenth Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split with the Ninth Circuit over how to count the 60-day departure period.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Hugo Monsalvo Velázquez, a Mexican citizen who entered the U.S. unlawfully as a teenager about 20 years before the case, built a life in Colorado — attending college, marrying, owning a home and small business, and raising two U.S.-citizen children. The government sought to deport him, but a judge gave him 60 days to leave voluntarily. The last day fell on a Saturday. He filed a motion to reopen his case the following Monday. The Board of Immigration Appeals said that was one day too late, triggering a 10-year bar on almost all immigration relief.
The question before the Court
When an immigrant's court-ordered deadline to leave the U.S. voluntarily falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, does the deadline automatically roll over to the next business day?
The Court's answer
Yes — when an immigrant's voluntary-departure deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it extends to the next business day. Monsalvo's 60th day fell on Saturday, December 11, 2021, which meant his effective deadline was Monday, December 13 — the same day he filed his motion to reopen. That motion was therefore timely, and the Board of Immigration Appeals was wrong to treat him as having missed his window.
The Court reached this conclusion by applying the principle that Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of existing government practice. Since at least the 1950s, immigration regulations have provided that deadlines expressed in "days" do not expire on Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays. Congress enacted the voluntary-departure deadline in 1996 inside the same section of the same law as other immigration deadlines — deadlines the government concedes also roll over on weekends. The identical word "days" should carry the same meaning throughout, and nothing in the statute's text or history supports treating the departure deadline differently.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Immigrants granted voluntary departure — allowing them to leave on their own terms rather than face forced removal — now have a predictable rule: if their departure window closes on a Saturday, Sunday, or federal holiday, they automatically get until the next business day. Missing that deadline can trigger a 10-year ban on most forms of immigration relief, so a two-day difference can have enormous consequences for families.
What changes now
The case goes back to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Court's ruling. Under the correct reading of the law, Monsalvo's motion to reopen was timely filed, which means the Board of Immigration Appeals must now address the motion's underlying merits — his argument that a recent Supreme Court ruling made him newly eligible to have his removal canceled. Whether he ultimately succeeds depends on that separate legal question. Going forward, immigration courts nationwide must apply the rolling-over rule to voluntary-departure deadlines.
What this does not decide
The Court stressed it is deciding only the meaning of §1229c(b)(2) — the specific voluntary-departure deadline enacted as part of IIRIRA in 1996. It explicitly noted that "different statutes passed at different times against different regulatory backdrops may bear different meanings," so the ruling does not automatically extend the rolling-over rule to every other immigration provision that uses the word "days."
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined in full by Justice Alito and joined in parts I and II by Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, would have vacated and remanded the case for the Tenth Circuit to address the newly raised jurisdictional question in the first instance — a question no court had previously considered. If forced to rule, he would hold the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction: under Nasrallah v. Barr, a 'final order of removal' means only the portion of a decision that finds deportability or orders removal, and Monsalvo's petition did not challenge that portion at all.
Dissent — Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, agreed on remanding the jurisdictional issue but wrote separately to argue the majority was wrong on the merits. '60 days' has a plain ordinary meaning — calendar days — and an immigrant can leave the country on a Saturday just as easily as on a Monday. The regulatory rolling-over rule explicitly applies only to regulatory deadlines, not statutory ones, and the presumption of consistent usage within a statute does not compel the same specialized meaning for a departure deadline that can be met any day of the week.
Dissent — Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, agreed the Court erred on jurisdiction but on narrower grounds than Justice Thomas: regardless of how broadly one defines 'final order of removal,' Monsalvo did not dispute a single word of it. His petition sought only a clarification of what §1229c(b)(2) means — which is not the same as seeking judicial review of a final removal order. After his victory in the Supreme Court, every word in the decisions finding him removable remained legally valid, which proves his petition was not really a challenge to that order.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Before reaching the deadline question, the Court addressed whether it could even hear the case. Under 8 U.S.C. §1252, courts may review 'final orders of removal' and 'all questions of law' arising from them. Monsalvo's petition asked the courts to interpret the meaning of '60 days' in his removal order — a legal question arising directly from that order — so review was proper. The Court rejected the government's argument that Monsalvo also had to separately challenge his removability, noting that nothing in §1252 imposes that requirement, and forcing litigants to add meritless claims just to get into court would be absurd.
- On the merits, the Court identified an interpretive ambiguity: the word 'days' in §1229c(b)(2) could plausibly mean plain calendar days (the Board's view) or carry the specialized legal meaning — common in court rules and many legal contexts — that automatically extends a deadline landing on a weekend or holiday to the next business day. The Court turned to the principle that Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of 'longstanding administrative construction,' meaning pre-existing government practice.
- The relevant practice dates at least to the 1950s: immigration regulations have continuously provided that when calculating the time for 'taking any action,' the term 'day' excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. The only notable change over decades was adding Saturdays to the exclusion list in 1987. Congress enacted §1229c(b)(2) as part of IIRIRA in 1996 squarely against this consistent regulatory backdrop.
- Congress placed the voluntary-departure deadline in §304 of IIRIRA alongside deadlines for filing motions to reopen (90 days) and motions to reconsider (30 days) — provisions the government concedes also roll over on weekends and holidays. The canon of consistent usage holds that identical words in the same statutory section, enacted at the same time, should bear the same meaning. That canon applied here with special force, making the rolling-over rule equally applicable to the departure deadline.
- The Court rejected three counterarguments. First, the government argued the regulatory definition technically applies only to regulatory deadlines, not statutory ones — but the question was not whether a regulation overrides a statute, only what Congress presumed when it wrote the statute. Second, the government argued that choosing '60 days' rather than codifying a pre-existing regulatory deadline showed different intent — but nothing in §304 hints at different treatment, and the government's own enforcement rules after 1996 never made that distinction. Third, a proposed 'procedural vs. substantive' line (filing deadlines roll over; departure deadlines do not because you can leave any day) found no support in the statutory text or regulatory history, and Congress may well have had practical reasons to keep both kinds of deadlines aligned.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Nasrallah v. Barr (590 U.S. 573)
The majority says Nasrallah's ruling on Convention Against Torture orders is irrelevant to and does not control jurisdiction here.