Thompson v. United States
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a federal law making it a crime to make 'false statements' to bank regulators does not cover statements that are merely misleading — the statement has to actually be untrue.
The decision vacated a man's conviction and sent the case back to a lower court to determine whether his statements about a bank loan were genuinely false, not just misleading.
How it got here: A federal jury convicted Thompson; the District Court denied his motion for acquittal; the Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Between 2011 and 2014, Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from a bank. After the bank failed, the FDIC took over debt collection. When contacted about a balance of over $269,000, Thompson told FDIC representatives he had only borrowed $110,000 — technically true of his first loan, but he left out the two later loans. He was charged under a federal law that makes it a crime to knowingly make "false statements" to influence the FDIC's handling of a loan.
The question before the Court
Can someone be convicted under a federal law that bans "false statements" to the FDIC if their statement was misleading but technically true?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that the federal law at issue punishes only statements that are genuinely false, not statements that are merely misleading while still being technically true. "False" means "not true," and some misleading statements are in fact true. The law's text uses only the word "false" — not "misleading" — and that omission is intentional: many other federal criminal statutes expressly cover both "false" and "misleading" statements, which would be unnecessary if "false" already captured misleading ones.
The Court did not decide whether Thompson's own statements were actually false. Neither the trial court nor the appeals court had addressed that question, so the case was sent back to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether a reasonable jury could find the statements were false when considered in their full context.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Federal prosecutors can no longer rely on the theory that a technically true but misleading statement is enough to convict someone under this bank-fraud law. Defendants who made statements that were literally accurate — even if incomplete or deceptive in context — have a stronger basis to challenge prosecution. The ruling also signals that courts should look to what words Congress actually chose when deciding the reach of a criminal statute.
What changes now
The Seventh Circuit must now decide whether, looking at the full context of Thompson's phone calls with the FDIC, a reasonable jury could find his statements were actually false — not just misleading. Both the Court and Thompson's own lawyers agreed that context matters in assessing falsity. If the Seventh Circuit finds sufficient evidence of falsity, Thompson's conviction could be reinstated; if not, he would be entitled to acquittal. Justice Jackson's concurrence suggested she believes the answer is clear and the conviction should stand.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Thompson's own statements were actually false. It also did not address how much context courts may consider in making that determination — it noted only that "at least some context is relevant." The ruling does not affect other federal statutes that explicitly prohibit both false and misleading statements.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Alito
Justice Alito joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to flag five points he viewed as most important. He emphasized that 'false' bears its ordinary meaning ('not true'), that falsity must always be judged in the full context of a statement (not just its literal words in isolation), that courts and juries should never reference whether a statement was 'misleading' in a § 1014 case, and that on remand the Seventh Circuit should apply the standard for judging whether any rational juror could find the statements false beyond a reasonable doubt.
Concurrence — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson agreed with the majority's interpretation of § 1014 but wrote separately to note that the trial jury was properly instructed — it was told only to find whether Thompson made 'false statements,' not misleading ones. Because the jury already found Thompson guilty under a correct instruction, Jackson suggested there is very little for the Seventh Circuit to revisit on remand and that the guilty verdict should in her view be reinstated.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court started with the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which criminalizes 'knowingly mak[ing] any false statement' to influence the FDIC's action on a loan. The statute says 'false' — it does not say 'misleading.' Because some misleading statements are technically true, and a true statement cannot be false, basic logic means at least some misleading statements fall outside the law's reach.
- The word 'any' before 'false statement' doesn't expand the law's coverage to include misleading statements. 'Any' broadens the category of false statements covered (all of them, of whatever kind), but the statement must still be false — just as a law covering 'any Ford owner' doesn't cover all car owners, only those with a Ford.
- Looking at the broader federal criminal code, many statutes — including other provisions in Title 18 — explicitly prohibit both 'false' and 'misleading' statements. Reading 'false' in § 1014 to already include 'misleading' would make those extra words in other statutes pointless, a result courts try to avoid.
- Historical context at the time Congress enacted § 1014 in 1948 reinforces this reading: none of the eleven predecessor statutes folded into § 1014 used the word 'misleading,' while many other laws of the same era used the phrase 'false or misleading.' When Congress wanted to cover misleading statements, it said so.
- Two prior Supreme Court decisions support the same conclusion. In United States v. Wells (1997), the Court held § 1014 has no materiality requirement because the statute doesn't mention it — the same logic applies to 'misleading.' In Williams v. United States (1982), the Court held that a conviction under § 1014 requires both a statement and the ability to characterize it as 'false' — meaning even a misleading omission isn't enough unless the statement itself is untrue.
- Because neither the trial court nor the appeals court decided whether Thompson's statements were actually false — they had ruled that 'misleading' was sufficient — the Court sent the case back to the Seventh Circuit to answer that question, with the clarification that context matters when judging whether a statement is false.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms United States v. Wells (519 U.S. 482)
The Court applied Wells' reasoning — that § 1014's silence on a concept means it doesn't cover it — to reach its holding on misleading statements.
Reaffirms Williams v. United States (458 U.S. 279)
The Court reaffirmed that § 1014 requires a statement capable of being characterized as false, which excludes merely misleading omissions.
Distinguishes Kay v. United States (303 U.S. 1)
The Court explained that Kay described false statements made with intent to mislead, and did not make misleading statements independently unlawful.