Bufkin v. Collins
The Supreme Court ruled that when veterans challenge a VA finding that evidence on their disability claim was not evenly balanced, a specialized appeals court must use a deferential 'clear error' standard — not a fresh, independent review of the record.
The decision limits the practical force of a 2002 law that required veterans courts to 'take due account' of the VA's benefit-of-the-doubt rule, a pro-veteran policy dating to the Civil War era that is supposed to tip close calls in the veteran's favor.
How it got here: Two veterans lost VA benefit decisions at the regional level, appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, then the Veterans Court (which applied clear-error review), then the Federal Circuit (which affirmed); the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Two veterans — one who served in the Air Force and one in the Army — sought VA disability benefits for service-connected PTSD. One was denied benefits entirely; the other was denied an increase in his disability rating. Both argued that the evidence for and against their claims was close enough that the VA's own "benefit-of-the-doubt" rule, which requires the VA to resolve evenly balanced evidence in a veteran's favor, should have entitled them to relief. The VA and its internal Board of Veterans' Appeals disagreed in both cases.
The question before the Court
When a veteran challenges the VA's ruling that the evidence for a disability claim was not evenly balanced, does the appeals court get to reweigh the entire record independently, or does it only check whether the VA's call was obviously wrong?
The Court's answer
No — the statutory command to "take due account" of the VA's benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not require the Veterans Court to conduct a fresh, independent review of whether evidence was evenly balanced. The Veterans Court must apply the same standards it uses for all other VA determinations: reviewing legal conclusions from scratch (de novo) and factual findings only when they are obviously wrong (clear-error review). Because deciding whether evidence is "approximately balanced" is primarily a factual task — marshaling and weighing case-specific evidence rather than developing broadly applicable legal principles — clear-error review applies.
A veteran can still get de novo review if the challenge is legal in nature, such as arguing the VA misunderstood what "approximate balance" means as a matter of law. But the typical challenge — arguing the VA got the weighing of evidence wrong in a particular case — is factual, and the appeals court must defer unless the VA's call was clearly mistaken.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Veterans who disagree with a VA decision that their evidence was not evenly balanced will face a high bar in appeals court — the court will only overturn the VA's call if it was clearly wrong, not because the court would weigh things differently. This makes it harder to challenge close calls on disability eligibility, especially for conditions like PTSD where medical evidence can be contested.
What changes now
Both veterans lose their appeals; the VA's denials stand because the Board's approximate-balance rulings were not clearly erroneous. Going forward, veterans challenging VA calls that their evidence was not evenly balanced will face a deferential clear-error standard in the Veterans Court. The Court left open whether the Veterans Court must raise benefit-of-the-doubt issues on its own, even when a veteran does not, reserving that question for a future case.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the Veterans Court must review the VA's benefit-of-the-doubt application on its own initiative even when a veteran fails to raise the issue on appeal. The ruling also does not affect legal challenges — such as arguing the VA misunderstood what "approximate balance" means — which still receive full de novo review.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson argued the majority is wrong on both counts. The 2002 amendment requiring the Veterans Court to 'take due account' of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was a direct congressional response to complaints that the Veterans Court was rubber-stamping VA decisions — it was meant to impose nondeferential review, not merely restate existing duties. Even if subsection (a)'s standards apply, the approximate-balance determination is a predominantly legal mixed question, analogous to probable cause, that should be reviewed de novo. The majority's reading reduces a substantive congressional mandate to an empty 'exclamation point.'
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the statute's text. Section 7261(b)(1) says the Veterans Court must 'take due account' of the VA's benefit-of-the-doubt application '[i]n making the determinations under subsection (a).' Because that review occurs as part of — not separate from — review under subsection (a), the same standards of review that govern subsection (a) also govern benefit-of-the-doubt challenges: de novo for legal issues, clear-error review for factual findings.
- The key question then became whether the 'approximate balance' determination — the VA's call that the evidence for and against a claim was not evenly matched — is a legal question, a factual finding, or a mixed question. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under whichever standard fits their dominant character.
- The approximate-balance determination has two steps: (1) the VA reviews and assigns weight to each piece of evidence — universally agreed to be factfinding reviewed for clear error; and (2) the VA decides whether the combined evidence is in approximate balance — a step that has both a legal element (applying the statutory standard) and a factual element (marshaling and comparing the weight of evidence on each side).
- For mixed questions, the Court applied the test from U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC (2018): the standard of review turns on whether the question primarily requires 'legal work' (developing principles for future cases) or 'factual work' (resolving case-specific evidence). Deciding whether a particular body of evidence is approximately balanced — as illustrated by the veterans' cases involving competing medical opinions — is immersed in case-specific facts and unlikely to generate broadly applicable legal rules, making it predominantly factual and subject to clear-error review.
- The Court rejected the analogy to probable-cause determinations, which appellate courts review de novo. Two features distinguish them: probable cause is a constitutional standard that carries a presumption of de novo review, while the approximate-balance standard is purely statutory; and probable cause requires developing an objective, hypothetical 'reasonable officer' standard that courts refine over time, whereas the approximate-balance inquiry is highly case-specific with no comparable body of evolving legal principle.
- The Court also addressed the surplusage concern — that its reading makes the 2002 amendment do no independent work. The Court answered that the amendment makes explicit a duty that was previously only implicit, and possibly requires the Veterans Court to raise benefit-of-the-doubt issues even when a veteran does not. Critically, the dissent's preferred reading (de novo review) would face the same surplusage problem, since legal questions were already subject to de novo review before 2002, so neither side's reading avoids some redundancy.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms U.S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC (583 U. S. 387)
Reaffirmed as the governing test for choosing the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact.
Distinguishes Ornelas v. United States (517 U. S. 690)
Probable-cause de novo review does not carry over to the VA's approximate-balance determination because the two standards differ in constitutional basis and legal character.