Lackey v. Stinnie
The Supreme Court ruled that civil rights plaintiffs who won only a temporary injunction — and whose case ended before a final court ruling — cannot collect attorney's fees, because they never truly 'prevailed' in a legally binding, court-ordered resolution.
The decision sets a bright-line rule that will make it harder for civil rights lawyers to recover fees in cases resolved by mootness, potentially affecting how often attorneys agree to take on cases where the main goal is short-term injunctive relief.
How it got here: The federal district court denied attorney's fees; a Fourth Circuit panel affirmed; the Fourth Circuit reversed en banc; the Virginia DMV Commissioner asked the Supreme Court to step in and the Court agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Virginia had a law that automatically suspended the driver's licenses of people who failed to pay court fines or costs, keeping them suspended until the debt was paid. A group of drivers who said they could not afford the fines sued the state's motor vehicle commissioner, arguing the law was unconstitutional. A federal court temporarily blocked enforcement. Before the case went to trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the law entirely and restored all suspended licenses — prompting a dispute over whether the drivers could collect attorney's fees.
The question before the Court
Can civil rights plaintiffs who won a temporary court order but whose case was dismissed as moot before a final ruling collect attorney's fees as "prevailing parties"?
The Court's answer
No — the drivers do not qualify as "prevailing parties" entitled to attorney's fees under the civil rights fee statute. The statute's phrase "prevailing party" is a legal term of art that, when Congress enacted it, referred to a party who successfully maintains a claim when the matter is finally resolved. A preliminary injunction is a temporary order based on a prediction of likely success — not a conclusive determination of the merits — and the case ending through mootness does not transform that temporary order into a final, binding resolution.
The Court held that both the change in the legal relationship between the parties and the permanence of that change must result from a judicial order. Because the drivers' case became moot before any final ruling, and because the legislature's repeal — not a court's judgment — is what made the injunction's effects lasting, the drivers gained no "enduring judicial relief" that would make them prevailing parties.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Civil rights lawyers and advocacy groups that bring cases seeking quick injunctive relief — for example, stopping a law that harms people right now — will generally be unable to recover attorney's fees if the case ends through mootness before a final judgment. That financial risk may deter attorneys from taking on certain civil rights cases, particularly those on behalf of low-income clients who cannot pay legal fees themselves.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the Fourth Circuit with instructions consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling — meaning the drivers cannot recover attorney's fees. Going forward, this decision establishes a uniform national rule: civil rights plaintiffs who win only a preliminary injunction and whose cases are dismissed as moot before a final judgment cannot collect attorney's fees under §1988(b). Congress retains the power to amend the statute to allow fees in a broader range of circumstances.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not affect the separate legal rules about when a *defendant* qualifies as a "prevailing party" under fee-shifting statutes — the Court explicitly set that question aside. It also does not address plaintiffs who win a final judgment or a court-approved consent decree, both of which can still support a fee award.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson argued that the text of §1988(b) nowhere requires a 'conclusive' final judgment — it asks only whether a party successfully maintained its claim when the case ended. She contended that an unreversed preliminary injunction that provides actual, lasting relief satisfies that test and that all eleven circuits to have considered the issue agreed. She also warned that the majority's bright-line rule will deter civil rights attorneys from taking cases where interim relief is the primary goal, and that the facts of this very case show that government defendants will strategically moot litigation to avoid paying fees.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court began with the text of §1988(b), which authorizes attorney's fees for the 'prevailing party' in civil rights cases. Treating 'prevailing party' as a legal term of art, the Court looked to legal dictionaries in use when Congress enacted the statute in 1976. Those dictionaries defined a prevailing party as one who 'successfully maintained' a claim 'at the end of the suit' — that is, when the matter is finally set at rest.
- Preliminary injunctions do not meet that standard because they are not final determinations on the merits. When a court grants a preliminary injunction, it decides only that the plaintiff is *likely* to succeed — along with factors like irreparable harm and the balance of equities. The injunction's purpose is to preserve the parties' positions until a full trial can resolve the dispute, not to conclusively adjudicate anyone's rights.
- The Court drew on two earlier decisions to anchor its reasoning. In Buckhannon (2001), the Court rejected the 'catalyst theory,' holding that a defendant's voluntary change in behavior — without any court order — cannot make a plaintiff a prevailing party because there was no 'judicially sanctioned change' in the parties' legal relationship. In Sole v. Wyner (2007), the Court held that a plaintiff who won a preliminary injunction but was later denied a permanent one did not prevail because the change in relationship was not 'enduring.'
- Today's decision extends those two requirements by adding that the enduring nature of the change must itself be judicially sanctioned. A plaintiff whose preliminary injunction remains in effect only because outside events (like a legislature repealing a law) mooted the case has not obtained enduring *judicial* relief — the permanence came from the legislature, not the court. External mootness cannot convert a temporary order into a conclusive adjudication.
- The Court also defended the bright-line rule on judicial-economy grounds. A clear rule is easy for courts to apply and avoids turning attorney's-fee disputes into sprawling follow-on litigation. Concerns that government defendants would strategically repeal laws to moot cases and escape fee awards were dismissed as speculative, consistent with the Court's rejection of similar fears in Buckhannon.
- Finally, the Court noted that Congress knows how to authorize fees for plaintiffs who succeed without a final judgment — it did exactly that in the Freedom of Information Act, which allows fees when a complainant 'substantially prevailed' even through a 'voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency.' Congress can similarly amend §1988(b) if it wants a different rule.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources (532 U.S. 598)
Court reaffirms that only judicially sanctioned changes in the parties' relationship can support a fee award.
Reaffirms Sole v. Wyner (551 U.S. 74)
Court extends Sole's 'enduring change' requirement, holding that mootness cannot supply the permanence a court order must provide.