Bouarfa v. Mayorkas
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that federal courts cannot review the government's decision to revoke an approved visa petition, because Congress gave the Secretary of Homeland Security broad, unrestricted discretion to make that call.
The decision leaves U.S. citizens who have had visa petitions revoked without a federal court forum to challenge the revocation — though they can file a new petition, and if that new petition is denied, judicial review remains available.
How it got here: A federal district court dismissed Bouarfa's suit for lack of jurisdiction; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed; Bouarfa asked the Supreme Court to step in, and the Court agreed to resolve a split among the federal appeals courts.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition to help her Palestinian husband gain permanent residency. The government approved it, then revoked the approval two years later after finding evidence that her husband had entered into a fraudulent marriage with a prior wife to obtain immigration benefits. Bouarfa disputed the evidence — including pointing to the ex-wife's recantation — but the immigration agency upheld the revocation and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed.
The question before the Court
Can a U.S. citizen go to federal court to challenge the government's decision to take back an already-approved visa petition for her noncitizen spouse?
The Court's answer
No — federal courts cannot review the government's decision to revoke an approved visa petition in this situation. The revocation statute (§1155) lets the Secretary of Homeland Security revoke any approved petition "at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause." That language — "may," "at any time," and "what he deems" — is textbook discretion with no conditions attached. A separate immigration law bars courts from reviewing decisions Congress has made discretionary, and the Court found §1155 clearly fits that description.
Bouarfa argued that once the agency discovers a prior sham marriage, revocation becomes legally required rather than discretionary, which would restore court review. The Court rejected that reading: the statute barring approval of sham-marriage-tainted petitions applies only at the initial approval stage and says nothing about what happens afterward. Congress separately gave the Secretary the choice to revoke — or not — whenever he sees good cause. The Court also rejected the argument that the agency's apparent practice of always revoking in these cases turned discretion into a mandate, since Congress tied the bar on judicial review to what the statute says, not how agencies behave.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
U.S. citizens whose already-approved visa petitions for a spouse are later revoked — even based on disputed facts — cannot challenge that revocation in federal court. Their only practical route to court review is to file a fresh petition and challenge a denial if one comes. This affects families in the middle of the immigration process who believed initial approval gave them a stable legal footing.
What changes now
Bouarfa cannot pursue her current challenge in federal court. However, the Court noted she has already filed a new visa petition on her husband's behalf, which was still pending at the time of the ruling. If that new petition is denied — rather than revoked — based on the sham-marriage finding, she can seek judicial review of that denial. The decision resolves a split among the federal appeals courts on whether visa revocations are judicially reviewable.
What this does not decide
The ruling does not decide whether courts can review revocations when the noncitizen is in removal proceedings, nor does it address whether a suit alleging the agency violated constitutional or procedural requirements when revoking a petition would be reviewable. It also does not decide whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips courts of jurisdiction over mandatory threshold findings.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The central legal question was whether revocation under §1155 is a decision made 'in the discretion of' the Secretary within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) — the federal immigration law that strips courts of the power to review certain discretionary agency decisions. If yes, courts have no jurisdiction to hear Bouarfa's challenge.
- The Court analyzed §1155's text: the Secretary 'may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition.' The word 'may' signals discretion; 'at any time' imposes no timing conditions; 'what he deems' reserves the judgment call entirely to the Secretary. Congress prescribed no criteria the Secretary must satisfy before acting.
- The Court looked at neighboring provisions for context: five other immigration statutes listed in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) are undisputedly discretionary, but each of those actually imposes more conditions on the Secretary than §1155 does. If those more constrained provisions are discretionary, §1155 — with no threshold requirements at all — certainly is too.
- Bouarfa argued that a separate provision, §1154(c) — which bars approving a petition when a prior sham-marriage finding exists — creates an ongoing duty to revoke any approval that later turns out to have been mistaken. The Court rejected this: §1154(c)'s command runs only to the point of initial approval and says nothing about revocation. The specific discretionary grant in §1155 forecloses reading in a silent mandate to revoke.
- The Court rejected the argument that consistent agency practice — the government could not identify a single case where it declined to revoke after finding a sham marriage — transforms a discretionary act into a mandatory one. The jurisdiction-stripping statute bars court review of decisions 'made discretionary by legislation,' not merely decisions the agency sometimes exercises variably. Rewarding inconsistency to preserve judicial review would create perverse incentives.
- The Court distinguished its earlier decision in Patel v. Garland (2022), which held that a similar jurisdiction-stripping provision covers even mandatory 'threshold requirements' for accessing discretionary relief. Because §1155 has no threshold requirements at all, the Court did not need to decide whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) reaches threshold findings — §1155 is purely discretionary from start to finish, so courts lack jurisdiction regardless.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Patel v. Garland (596 U. S. 328)
Patel's threshold-requirements analysis doesn't apply here because §1155 has no threshold requirements at all.
Reaffirms Kucana v. Holder (558 U. S. 233)
The bar on judicial review covers decisions made discretionary by legislation, not merely by agency choice.