Humphrey's v. United States
The Supreme Court ruled that President Franklin Roosevelt illegally fired a Federal Trade Commissioner, William Humphrey, because Congress had limited removal from that office to specific causes like neglect of duty or misconduct, and the President had removed him simply for political disagreement.
The decision drew a sharp line between purely executive officers, whom the President can fire at will, and officials at independent agencies like the FTC that perform judicial- and legislative-type work, whom Congress can protect from at-will removal.
“We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers of the character of those just named.”
The Court's core holding that the President cannot freely remove officials performing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial duties.
How it got here: The Court of Claims certified two legal questions to the Supreme Court about the President's removal power in a suit by Humphrey's estate seeking unpaid salary.
The Case in Depth
What happened
William Humphrey was a Federal Trade Commissioner appointed by President Hoover to a seven-year term. President Roosevelt asked him to resign because he wanted commissioners who shared his administration's views, not because of any wrongdoing. Humphrey refused, and Roosevelt fired him anyway. Humphrey continued to claim he was still a commissioner and sought his salary until he died.
The question before the Court
Could President Roosevelt fire a Federal Trade Commissioner simply because he wanted his own people in the job, even though the law only allowed removal for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or wrongdoing?
Why it matters
The ruling protected the independence of agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and similar bodies from presidential control, letting Congress insulate their members from being fired over policy disagreements. This distinction has shaped how independent federal agencies operate and how much control presidents can exert over them ever since.
What changes now
The Court's answers to the certified questions resolve the legal issue completely, allowing the Court of Claims to proceed with Humphrey's estate's suit for unpaid salary using the rule that his removal was unlawful. This is a final merits ruling on the certified legal questions, not a remand for further factual proceedings, though the Court of Claims still had to apply the ruling to award relief.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly limited its ruling to officers like Humphrey who perform quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial duties, not purely executive officers, whose removal remains governed by Myers v. United States. It left open, for future cases, any officials whose duties fall in a gray area between purely executive and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice McReynolds
Justice McReynolds agreed that both certified questions should be answered yes, aligning with the majority's conclusion that Humphrey's removal was unlawful. He referred to his own earlier dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States for his broader views on presidential removal power, without adding new reasoning here.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first asked whether the Federal Trade Commission Act's list of removal causes (inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance) was meant to be the only grounds for removal, or merely illustrative.
- Looking at the statute's fixed seven-year terms, staggered appointments, and legislative history showing Congress wanted a nonpartisan, expert body independent of the executive, the Court concluded Congress meant to limit removal to the causes listed.
- The Court then asked whether Congress had the constitutional power to restrict the President's removal authority over this kind of official, distinguishing this case from Myers v. United States, which involved a postmaster performing purely executive duties.
- The Court reasoned that the FTC performs quasi-legislative work (investigating and reporting to Congress) and quasi-judicial work (acting like a master in chancery and issuing cease-and-desist orders), making it unlike a purely executive office whose holder simply carries out the President's will.
- Because maintaining the separation of powers requires that each branch remain free from coercive control by the others, the Court held that Congress may shield officers performing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions from removal except for the causes it specifies.
- Applying this rule, the Court concluded that Humphrey's removal, based only on policy disagreement rather than any of the statutory causes, exceeded the President's constitutional removal power over this type of officer.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Myers v. United States (272 U.S. 52)
Confines Myers's rule of unrestricted presidential removal power to purely executive officers like postmasters.
Distinguishes Shurtleff v. United States (189 U.S. 311)
Finds Shurtleff inapplicable because that case involved no fixed term of office, unlike the FTC commissioner's seven-year term.