Myers v. United States
The Supreme Court ruled that the President has the sole constitutional power to remove executive officials he appoints with the Senate's approval, even when a federal law says the Senate must also approve the firing.
The decision struck down part of an 1876 law that required Senate consent to remove postmasters, and it became one of the Court's most influential statements on how power is divided between the President and Congress over the executive branch.
How it got here: Myers sued for his back salary in the Court of Claims, which ruled against him on timing grounds, and he appealed that judgment directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Frank Myers was appointed by the President, with Senate approval, as a first-class postmaster in Portland, Oregon, for a four-year term. Before his term ended, the Postmaster General removed him on the President's orders, without asking the Senate to approve the removal as an 1876 law required. Myers refused to accept the removal and sued for the salary he said he was still owed.
The question before the Court
Could Congress force the President to get the Senate's approval before removing a postmaster he had appointed with that same approval?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that Congress could not require Senate approval before the President removed a postmaster the President had appointed with the Senate's consent. It held that the Constitution's grant of "executive Power" to the President includes, by implication, the power to remove the officials who help him carry out the laws, and that this removal power is tied to the power of appointment rather than to the Senate's separate role in confirming appointments.
Because the 1876 law required Senate consent for removal as well as appointment, the Court found it unconstitutional and let the President remove Myers without the Senate's approval. The ruling rested heavily on an early 1789 congressional debate concluding the President held this power alone, though the Court noted it was not deciding removal rules for officers appointed in other ways.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
The ruling gave presidents clearer authority to fire the officials who carry out federal law without needing Congress's sign-off, strengthening presidential control over the executive branch. It has shaped disputes ever since over how much Congress can insulate federal officials and independent agency heads from presidential removal.
What changes now
Because this was a final decision on the merits, the Court of Claims judgment against Myers' estate stood, meaning she recovered nothing. The ruling settled, for the time being, that Congress could not require Senate approval before the President removed executive officers appointed with Senate consent, though the Court expressly left open questions about officers appointed by other means or entities, an issue the Court would revisit in later cases limiting this decision's reach.
What this does not decide
The Court said it was not deciding whether Congress could restrict removal of officers whose appointment Congress had vested in someone other than the President, such as department heads, nor whether the same rule applied to non-constitutional judges. It also did not decide removal rules for military officers or high political officers beyond the postmaster at issue.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Holmes
Justice Holmes wrote a brief dissent agreeing with McReynolds and Brandeis. He argued that because Congress created the postmaster's office and could abolish it entirely, Congress could just as easily condition or restrict how the officeholder could be removed, without infringing on any inherent presidential power.
Dissent — Justice McReynolds
Justice McReynolds argued at length that nothing in the Constitution's text clearly gives the President an unrestricted removal power, especially over inferior officers like postmasters, and that Congress has long and consistently restricted removals by statute with presidential acquiescence. He would have ruled for Myers' estate.
Dissent — Justice Brandeis
Justice Brandeis marshaled extensive historical evidence that Congress had repeatedly and successfully conditioned removal of inferior officers on Senate consent since the earliest days of the Republic. He argued the separation of powers was meant to prevent arbitrary power, not maximize efficiency, and that Congress's power to fix an office's tenure includes power to limit removal.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read Article II's grant of 'the executive Power' to the President as including, by default, the power to appoint and remove the officials who help him execute the laws, since he cannot enforce the laws alone.
- It treated the power to remove an official as naturally bundled with the power to appoint that official, a long-recognized principle of legal interpretation, so that whoever effectively controls appointment also controls removal unless the Constitution says otherwise.
- The Court read the Constitution's specific mention of Senate approval only for appointments, not removals, as a deliberate limitation that should not be stretched to cover removals as well, since limits on a general power are read narrowly.
- It gave heavy weight to the First Congress's 1789 debate over the Department of Foreign Affairs, where lawmakers who had helped write the Constitution concluded that the President alone could remove such officers, treating that early, considered judgment as strong evidence of what the Constitution means.
- The Court concluded that letting Congress or the Senate block removals would let a hostile Senate saddle the President with subordinates he no longer trusted, undermining his constitutional duty to make sure the laws are faithfully carried out.
- Applying this reasoning, the Court held that the 1876 law's requirement of Senate consent to remove a postmaster conflicted with the President's removal power and was therefore unconstitutional.