Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co
The Supreme Court ruled that Norfolk Southern Railway can be sued in Pennsylvania for injuries a former employee suffered in other states, because the company consented to Pennsylvania's courts when it registered to do business there.
The decision means states may condition the right to do business on a company's agreement to be sued on any claim in their courts — potentially reshaping where corporations can be brought to court across the country.
“Nothing in the Due Process Clause requires such an incongruous result.”
The majority rejecting Norfolk Southern's argument that the Constitution entitled it to greater protection from lawsuits than its own employees receive.
How it got here: Mr. Mallory sued in Pennsylvania state court; Norfolk Southern contested jurisdiction; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in Norfolk Southern's favor; Mallory appealed and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a split between state supreme courts.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Robert Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern railway for nearly 20 years in Ohio and Virginia, where he alleges he was exposed to asbestos and other carcinogens. After leaving the company, he moved briefly to Pennsylvania before returning to Virginia, where he was diagnosed with cancer. He hired Pennsylvania lawyers and sued Norfolk Southern there. The company objected, pointing out that Mallory no longer lived in Pennsylvania and his injuries did not occur there — only his lawsuit was filed there.
The question before the Court
Can a state require out-of-state companies to consent to being sued in its courts on any kind of claim, as the price of getting a license to do business there?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Pennsylvania's law, which requires out-of-state companies to agree to be sued in Pennsylvania on any claim as a condition of registering to do business there, does not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process. The case was controlled by a 1917 Supreme Court precedent, Pennsylvania Fire, which unanimously upheld a nearly identical Missouri law. Because Norfolk Southern registered in Pennsylvania in 1998 — and knew that registration meant consenting to be sued there — it was bound by that agreement when Mallory filed suit.
The Court rejected Norfolk Southern's argument that a 1945 landmark ruling, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, had quietly overturned the older rule. International Shoe only created a new way to sue companies that had not consented to a state's jurisdiction — it left intact the rule that a company that did consent could be held to that agreement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was wrong to conclude that Pennsylvania Fire had been "implicitly overruled"; lower courts must follow controlling Supreme Court precedent and leave any overruling to the Supreme Court itself. The case is sent back to lower courts for further proceedings.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Companies that register to do business in Pennsylvania — and potentially in other states that adopt similar laws — can now be sued there on any claim, including claims with no connection to that state. This gives plaintiffs more choice of where to file, which matters greatly when some courts are seen as more favorable. Businesses operating across state lines face new exposure to lawsuits in distant courthouses.
What changes now
The case returns to Pennsylvania courts, where Norfolk Southern may pursue its dormant Commerce Clause argument — a claim that the registration scheme unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce by exposing out-of-state companies to suits with no connection to Pennsylvania. Justice Alito's concurrence signals real doubt about whether the law survives that challenge. For now, Mr. Mallory's suit may proceed, but if the Commerce Clause challenge succeeds on remand, the statute enabling his suit could still be struck down.
What this does not decide
The Court explicitly declines to say whether other registration-based jurisdiction laws in different circumstances would satisfy due process, limiting its ruling to these specific facts. It also leaves entirely open whether Pennsylvania's law violates the dormant Commerce Clause — a separate constitutional limit on state power over interstate commerce — which Justice Alito's concurrence suggests could ultimately doom the scheme.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson agreed with the result but wrote separately to ground her analysis in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (1982), which she read as confirming that personal jurisdiction is an individual, waivable right. Because Norfolk Southern voluntarily registered knowing the jurisdictional consequences, it effectively waived its right to object to Pennsylvania's courts. In her view, having made that choice, the company cannot now claim a due process violation, regardless of whether the general-jurisdiction rules from cases like Daimler would otherwise protect it.
Concurrence in part — Justice Alito
Justice Alito joined only Parts I and III-B of the majority opinion — the portions holding that Pennsylvania Fire controls and that no due process violation occurred here given Norfolk Southern's extensive Pennsylvania operations and clear notice of the jurisdictional consequences. He declined to join the plurality's broader historical and doctrinal analysis. He wrote separately to argue that Pennsylvania's law likely violates the dormant Commerce Clause, which restricts states from unduly burdening interstate commerce, and urged that challenge to be seriously considered on remand.
Dissent — Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett argued that the majority's 'consent' framing is a legal fiction that effectively guts Daimler AG v. Bauman and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown — the decisions establishing that a corporation is subject to all-purpose jurisdiction only where it is essentially 'at home.' She contended that International Shoe swept away exactly this kind of implied-consent fiction, leaving Pennsylvania Fire as implicitly overruled. Registration-based general jurisdiction, she said, lacks both historical tradition and modern acceptance, and the majority's ruling hands states a roadmap to manufacture 'consent' and evade constitutional limits on their courts' reach.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The case turns on consent as a basis for personal jurisdiction — the power of a court to require a party to appear and answer. The Court's starting point was that personal jurisdiction is an individual, waivable right: a company that voluntarily agrees to be sued in a state's courts cannot later claim that being held to that agreement violates due process.
- The Court identified Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. (1917) as directly controlling. In that unanimous decision, the Court upheld a Missouri law requiring out-of-state insurance companies to consent to suit on any claim — including claims with no connection to Missouri — as a condition of doing business there. The factual parallel to Pennsylvania's law and Norfolk Southern's situation was nearly complete.
- Norfolk Southern argued that International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) — the landmark ruling that built modern personal-jurisdiction law around a 'minimum contacts' test — had effectively erased Pennsylvania Fire. The Court disagreed: International Shoe only created an additional pathway to sue companies that had not consented to a state's jurisdiction. It said nothing about, and did not disturb, the separate rule that consenting companies can be held to their consent.
- The Court drew a clear line between two independent roads to jurisdiction: the consent road (Pennsylvania Fire — a company that agreed to be sued can be sued) and the contacts road (International Shoe — a company that did not agree can still be sued if its in-state activities make litigation fair and just). Both remain valid and coexist; International Shoe expanded, rather than contracted, the overall reach of state courts.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had concluded that intervening decisions had 'implicitly overruled' Pennsylvania Fire and ruled for Norfolk Southern on that basis. The Supreme Court held this was legal error: when a Supreme Court precedent directly controls a case, a lower court must follow it and leave any overruling to the Supreme Court alone. That obligation holds even if the lower court thinks the precedent sits in tension with more recent decisions.
- The Court also rejected Norfolk Southern's fairness argument. Given that the company had registered in Pennsylvania for over 20 years, operated thousands of miles of track there, employed nearly 5,000 Pennsylvanians, and explicitly understood the jurisdictional consequences of registration, there was nothing unfair about requiring it to answer suit there.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. (243 U. S. 93)
Confirmed as directly controlling and still-good law governing consent-based jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations.
Distinguishes International Shoe Co. v. Washington (326 U. S. 310)
Held to govern only non-consenting defendants; it did not address or eliminate consent-based jurisdiction established by Pennsylvania Fire.
Distinguishes Shaffer v. Heitner (433 U. S. 186)
The statement that prior decisions inconsistent with International Shoe are overruled does not apply, because Pennsylvania Fire is not inconsistent with International Shoe.