Moore v. Harper
The Supreme Court ruled that state legislatures cannot use the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution as a shield against review by their own state courts — states retain the power to enforce their constitutions against partisan gerrymandering and other election rules set by their legislatures.
The decision rejects the so-called 'independent state legislature' theory, which had gained attention as a potential tool to insulate state legislative decisions on federal elections from state court challenge, particularly in redistricting and presidential-election disputes.
How it got here: The North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the state's 2021 congressional map on state constitutional grounds; state legislators sought review and the Supreme Court declined to stay the decision but later agreed to hear the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
After the 2020 census gave North Carolina an additional congressional seat, the state's Republican-led legislature drew a new congressional map along party lines. Multiple groups of voters and civic organizations sued in state court, arguing the map was an unlawful partisan gerrymander that violated the North Carolina Constitution's guarantees of free elections and equal voting power. A state trial court agreed, finding the map was deliberately designed to maximize Republican advantage in the state's congressional delegation.
The question before the Court
Can state legislatures draw congressional maps and set federal election rules free from limits in their own state constitutions and courts?
The Court's answer
No — the Elections Clause does not free state legislatures from their own state constitutions when they set federal election rules. When a state legislature draws congressional maps or otherwise regulates federal elections, it acts both as a lawmaking body bound by its state constitution and as an entity with authority delegated by the Federal Constitution. Both constitutions restrain it. State courts therefore retain their normal power to strike down Elections Clause legislation that violates state constitutional provisions. The Court grounded this conclusion in three earlier unanimous decisions, the founding-era historical record, and the basic principle that legislatures are creatures of the constitutions that create them.
The Court also identified a limit: state courts may not so far exceed the ordinary bounds of judicial review that they arrogate to themselves the legislative power the Elections Clause places in state legislatures. The Court declined to adopt a specific test for that boundary and declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court's own rulings crossed it, because the challengers never properly raised that argument before the Court.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Voters challenging congressional maps or other election rules under their state constitutions can continue to bring those claims in state court, even after the Supreme Court's 2019 ruling closed federal courts to partisan-gerrymandering claims. State legislators cannot invoke the Elections Clause to place redistricting decisions beyond the reach of their own state constitution. The specific standard for when federal courts may second-guess state court rulings in election cases remains unresolved.
What changes now
The affirmance means North Carolina must draw new congressional maps consistent with its state constitution. The broader question — what specific standard federal courts should use to determine when a state court has gone too far in reviewing election laws under the Elections Clause — remains unresolved and awaits a future case where the issue is squarely presented. Justice Kavanaugh urged the Court to eventually adopt Chief Justice Rehnquist's standard from Bush v. Gore: whether the state court impermissibly distorted state law beyond a fair reading.
What this does not decide
The Court did not adopt any specific test for when a state court interpretation of state law goes too far under the Elections Clause. It also declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court's own rulings crossed that line. The decision does not pass on the constitutionality of any particular congressional map adopted during the remedial proceedings.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh joined the majority fully but wrote separately to emphasize two points. First, because the Elections Clause expressly assigns authority to state legislatures, a state court's interpretation of state law in federal election cases is itself subject to federal court review — deference is not abdication. Second, he urged that the Court should eventually distill its general principle into the specific standard from Bush v. Gore: whether the state court 'impermissibly distorted' state law 'beyond what a fair reading required.' He noted that since petitioners disclaimed any argument that the North Carolina court misread its constitution, this case was not the occasion to adopt that test.
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas argued the case was plainly moot: the North Carolina Supreme Court had overruled Harper I and dismissed all plaintiffs' claims with prejudice on state-law grounds, meaning the Elections Clause issue could no longer affect any live dispute or the final judgment. He also disagreed on the merits, arguing that the Elections Clause delegates a federal power that transcends state constitutional limits — distinguishing the procedural question of who constitutes 'the Legislature' from the substantive question of what laws that legislature can enact. He warned that the majority's framework will draw federal courts into uncertain, politically charged reviews of state constitutional law.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Before reaching the merits, the Court had to decide whether the case was still live after the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled its own earlier decision (Harper I) on state-law grounds and dismissed all plaintiffs' claims. The Court found the dispute remained real: Harper I's judgment enjoining the 2021 maps had never been vacated; the state legislators conceded they were still bound by it; and a North Carolina statute provided that a Supreme Court reversal of Harper I would automatically revive the 2021 maps — giving the legislators a concrete stake in a ruling from this Court.
- The Court also confirmed jurisdiction under the federal statute permitting review of 'final judgments' from state high courts. Although Harper I was technically interlocutory — it remanded the case for remedial proceedings rather than ending it — the Court applied the Cox Broadcasting doctrine, which treats a state high court's resolution of a federal issue as sufficiently 'final' when that issue will survive and require decision regardless of how later state proceedings come out. Because subsequent North Carolina Supreme Court proceedings had not altered Harper I's Elections Clause analysis or undone its injunction, the federal issue remained live.
- Turning to the merits, the Court traced the deep roots of judicial review — the power of courts to void laws that violate a constitution — back to pre-Constitutional Convention state decisions, founding-era commentary by Madison and Hamilton, and the Framers' own debates. By the time Marbury v. Madison (1803) formalized the doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall called judicial review one of society's 'fundamental principles.' The central question was whether the Elections Clause carves out an exception to that baseline principle.
- Three earlier unanimous decisions answered that question against the state legislators. Hildebrant (1916) upheld a state referendum as a valid check on Elections Clause legislation. Smiley v. Holm (1932) required state legislative action under the Clause to follow the state's normal lawmaking process, including the governor's veto. Arizona State Legislature (2015) reaffirmed that whatever entity exercises redistricting authority, it remains subject to state constitutional constraints. Together, these precedents established that the Elections Clause vests lawmaking power in state legislatures, not absolute power above the constitutions that created them.
- The Court reinforced this with founding-era evidence: Delaware's 1792 constitution and Maryland's 1810 constitution both explicitly constrained how their legislatures could regulate federal elections, and multiple state constitutions of that era required elections 'by ballot' — directly governing the 'manner' of federal elections under the Clause. The Framers borrowed the Elections Clause language from the Articles of Confederation, under which states routinely imposed constitutional limits on the appointment of delegates, confirming they did not understand that language to insulate legislative action from state constitutional provisions.
- The Court added a limiting principle running the other direction: although state courts may enforce state constitutional limits on Elections Clause legislation, they cannot exceed 'the ordinary bounds of judicial review' so as to usurp the power the Clause specifically reserves to state legislatures. The Court declined to adopt any specific test for that boundary — explicitly leaving the question open — and declined to rule on whether the North Carolina Supreme Court itself had crossed the line, because the state legislators disclaimed at oral argument any request that the Court second-guess the North Carolina court's reading of state law.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Smiley v. Holm (285 U.S. 355)
Reaffirmed that state legislatures exercising Elections Clause power must follow their state constitution's lawmaking requirements.
Reaffirms Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant (241 U.S. 565)
Reaffirmed that a state referendum can validly check a legislature's Elections Clause legislation.
Reaffirms Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n (576 U.S. 787)
Reaffirmed that whoever exercises redistricting authority remains subject to state constitutional constraints.
Distinguishes McPherson v. Blacker (146 U.S. 1)
Distinguished as addressing a direct conflict with the Electors Clause, not a conflict between state constitution and state legislature.
Distinguishes Leser v. Garnett (258 U.S. 130)
Distinguished as involving a ratification function, not the lawmaking function the Elections Clause assigns to state legislatures.